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Foreword
Mr Justice Sweeney
Our system of criminal justice is not perfect. Despite all its safeguards and the strivings of the vast majority of 
those of us who are involved in its conduct, a 
risk of miscarriages remains. Even in the cur-
rent state of the public finances, we must con-
tinue to recognise and confront that risk. Mis-
carriages that have taken place, perhaps many 
years ago, must be identified and put right; the 
risk of miscarriages in the future must be yet 
further minimised. 
Since it began its work in 1997, the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission has been respon-
sible for examining claims that a miscarriage 
has occurred, and for referring to the Court of 
Appeal cases in which it believes that there is 
a real possibility that the resultant appeal will 
be allowed. Aspects of its work have been the 
subject of criticism. Some have suggested that 
it should be replaced. Yet over the years since 
1997 the involvement of both the media and 
voluntary organisations in the investigation, 
exposure and future minimisation of miscar-
riages has diminished. 
Nevertheless, as the deputy chair of the 
commission acknowledges in this publication, 
journalists, pressure groups, academics and 
others still have vital roles to play in uncov-
ering miscarriages of justice, in ensuring that 
miscarriages remain matters of real public con-
cern and in keeping up to the mark those who 
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are charged with investigating and/or remedy-
ing them. Against that background, we can all 
agree that further improvements are possible, 
but what should they be? This is thus a question 
that is ripe for consideration in the Justice Gap 
series. The result is an excellent and thought-
provoking collection of essays by distinguished 
authors from across the spectrum of involve-
ment and interest. 
It examines, among other things: the events 
that resulted in the creation of the commission; 
what is or should be regarded as a miscarriage 
of justice; the way in which miscarriages may 
arise; the effect on the victims of miscarriages 
who continue to protest their innocence (par-
ticularly while serving a long sentence of im-
prisonment); the way in which the commission 
has carried out its work from both a day-to-day 
and an overall perspective; its relationship with 
the Court of Appeal; frustrations with and criti-
cisms of the commission; arguments in support 
of the work of the commission; and suggestions 
for the way ahead.
In reading the essays I was particularly 
struck by the different referral test applied by 
the commission in Scotland, and by the way 
in which the Canadian criminal justice system 
learns lessons for the future when a miscar-
riage has taken place. Even for the experienced 
lawyer, the content provides a salutary remind-
er that anything less than the highest standard 
of professionalism increases the risk of mis-
carriages. On the other hand, and although 
the perceived reasons for it are troubling, it is 
encouraging to read of the creation of the 
Centre for Criminal Appeals which will be 
a not-for-profit multi-disciplinary specialist 
legal organisation. 
The essays make a valuable contribution to 
what is a necessary, vital and current debate. 
I commend them to you.
Nigel Sweeney was called to the Bar (Middle 
Temple) in 1976, and was a member of 
Chambers at 6 King’s Bench Walk for more 
than 30 years. He was appointed a Junior 
Treasury Counsel in 1987, Senior Treasury 
Counsel in 1992, and First Senior Treasury 
Counsel in 1997.  He took Silk in 2000.  
He was involved in the miscarriage appeals 
of  the Guildford 4, Derek Bentley and James 
Hanratty, as well as in nearly 50 terrorist cases 
– such as the Brighton Bombing, the Clapham 
bomb factory, the Al Qaeda ricin conspiracy, 
and the 21/7 London bombers ; official secrets 
cases including David Shayler (MI5) and David 
Tomlinson (MI6); and murder cases  such as 
Michael Stone, Stephen Lawrence, and 
Damilola Taylor. 
A Recorder of the Crown Court for many 
years, he was appointed to the Queen’s Bench 
Division of the High Court in October 2008. 
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Introduction
T his collection of essays was com-missioned last year shortly after the 20th anniversary of the release of the 
Birmingham Six. On 14 March 1991, Paddy Hill, 
Hugh Callaghan, Richard McIlkenny, Gerry 
Hunter, Billy Power and Johnny Walker with 
Chris Mullin MP stood outside the Old Bailey 
free after 16 years, having had their convictions 
overturned for the murder of 21 people in two 
pubs in Birmingham.
That most notorious miscarriage of justice 
came hard on the heels of other judicial scan-
dals and set in motion a series of events. Such 
was the level of public and political concern 
that a Royal Commission was established and, 
ultimately, the collapse of public confidence led 
to the creation of the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission 13 years ago as the independent 
body to investigate miscarriages.
This idea behind this publication was to ex-
plore the various issues to do with the inves-
tigation of miscarriages of justice. We invited 
contributions from leading thinkers in the 
criminal appeals field, not just lawyers but 
campaigners, journalists and academics. 
The brief that we sent out to prospective 
contributors was to explore “the responsibil-
ity not just on government but on all involved 
(lawyers, journalists, academics and campaign-
ers…) to assist the victims of miscarriages of 
justice”. 
It said: “There is a recognition that the vic-
tims of alleged miscarriages need help beyond 
the role of CCRC and so the essays would 
address those reasons why the wrongfully 
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Introduction
accused are being failed by the criminal jus-
tice system and what role should the various 
groups play in promoting the interests of the 
wrongly accused.”
Since the creation of the CCRC concern 
over miscarriages of justice appears to have 
slipped from the radar of public consciousness. 
The topic has been consigned to some distant 
‘Life on Mars’ past. The media, which did 
so much of the spadework exposing the 
notorious miscarriages through the 1970s and 
1980s through, for example, the BBC’s Rough 
Justice, has long given up. The broadcaster 
pulled the plug on Rough Justice after 25 years 
in 2007; Michael Jackson, chief executive of 
Channel 4, dismissed Trial and Error, which 
also investigated miscarriages, and its subject 
matter as a ‘bit 1980s’.
Of course, the issue doesn’t go away.
Contributors to this collection come from all 
different sides of the debate. All recognise the 
need for a debate. No one is complacent.
The CCRC receives some 1,000 new applica-
tions every year mainly from prisoners claim-
ing to be serving time for crimes they didn’t 
commit. The commission described by one 
contributor as “a remarkable innovation” in 
the criminal justice landscape (an independent 
public body established to investigate wrong-
ful convictions and the appropriateness of 
sentences) struggles with year-on-year cuts. It 
faces strong criticism from some commentators 
who argue that it is failing to do what it was set 
up to but also support from others. Both views 
are reflected in this publication.
The idea behind this collection of essays was 
not a critique of the failings perceived or other-
wise of the CCRC nor of the Court of Appeal.
This is the fourth publication in the Justice 
Gap series which aims to shine light on differ-
ent aspects of ‘access to justice’. 
In particular, the series aims:
  to make a positive and different 
contribution to the debate to improve 
‘access to justice’ for ordinary people;
  to challenge received wisdoms;
  to be thought-provoking; and
  to raise the profile of the issues.
Thank you
We are grateful to all the contributors. Thanks 
for your time, effort and patience.
Thanks also to Michael Mansfield QC 
for his continued support to the Justice Gap 
series; Kim Evans, commissioning editor on 
www.thejusticegap.com; and all those who 
have contributed to and otherwise supported it. 
Thanks also to Gus Sellitto and Richard Elsen, 
co-directors of the specialist research company 
Jures which supports the series, and Solicitors 
Journal for publishing our work.
We hope you enjoy the collection. We hope 
it is a positive contribution to an important 
debate.
Jon Robins
www.thejusticegap.com
March 2012
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Contributors
Ralph Barrington 
Ralph Barrington joined Essex Police in 1964, aged 20. He 
became a detective constable in January 1967 and became 
head of Essex CID in February 1987 on his promotion to 
detective chief superintendent. He remained as the senior 
detective in the force until June 1997 when he retired to 
take up the post of investigations adviser to the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission until March 2011.
Campbell Malone 
Campbell Malone is the chair of the Criminal Appeal 
Lawyers Association (CALA) a body he helped to set up. He 
has enjoyed a 40-year career as a criminal lawyer, earning 
a national reputation as one of the country’s leading 
miscarriages of justice campaigners. The Legal 500 refers 
to him as “undoubtedly ‘the elder statesman’ of criminal 
appeals”.
Laura Janes 
Laura Janes is a solicitor with six years’ experience of rep-
resenting children and young people in detention. Before 
joining SCOMO last year, she was a solicitor at the How-
ard League for Penal Reform. Her practice covers prison 
law, criminal appeals and public law. Laura specialises 
in representing children serving life sentences before the 
Parole Board.
David Jessel
David Jessel is a broadcaster, investigative journal-
ist (Rough Justice and Trial and Error), campaigner 
and former commissioner at the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission.
Glyn Maddocks 
Glyn Maddocks is a solicitor and consultant with Gabb & 
Co. He specialises in civil litigation, particularly personal 
injury and clinical negligence, and in public law including 
judicial review.
Alex Bailin QC
Alex Bailin is a barrister at Matrix Chambers. He was 
lead counsel for JUSTICE in the Adams case in the UK 
Supreme Court, which considered the correct meaning of 
‘miscarriage of justice’. He has been instructed in more 
than 20 cases before the Supreme Court, House of Lords, 
Privy Council and European Court of Human Rights.
Vera Baird QC 
Vera Baird is a practising Queen’s Counsel specialising in 
criminal work. She is co-director of Astraea Research and a 
lecturer and writer. She was MP for Redcar between 2001 
and 2010, a minister in the Labour government in 2006, 
and former Solicitor General.
Emily Bolton 
Emily Bolton is a solicitor with a long-term interest in cases 
of wrongful conviction. She set up the Innocence Project 
New Orleans and is an associate with Reprieve, focusing on 
death penalty casework. She is working on the establish-
ment of a non-profit centre for criminal appeals.
John Cooper QC 
John Cooper practises from 25 Bedford Row. He specialises 
in serious crime including murder, serious violence, drug 
trafficking, terrorism, fraud, human rights and media.
Matt Evans
Matt Evans is managing solicitor of the Prisoners’ Advice 
Service, the only UK charity with a specific remit to provide 
free prison law advice. Matt studied law at the London 
School of Economics and has worked at a number of leading 
legal aid firms including TV Edwards and Hickman & Rose.
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Dr Michael Naughton 
Michael Naughton is a senior lecturer in the School of Law 
and School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies 
(SPAIS), University of Bristol. He is the founder and direc-
tor of the Innocence Network UK (INUK), an organisation 
that facilitates casework and communications in the area of 
wrongful convictions and has actively supported the crea-
tion of more than 30 Innocence projects in UK universities. 
Dr Angus Nurse 
Angus Nurse is lecturer in criminology at Birmingham City 
University where he teaches and researches criminology 
and criminal justice. He was research fellow at the Univer-
sity of Lincoln’s Law School from 2008 to 2011, researching 
civil justice systems and criminal justice and teaching in 
constitutional law and human rights. Before this, he was an 
investigator for the Local Government Ombudsman.
Dr Eamonn O’Neill 
Eamonn O’Neill is a lecturer in journalism and course 
director of the MSc in investigative journalism at the 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Over a career span-
ning 22 years, he has been honoured for his investigative 
journalism in both broadcast and print with awards in the 
UK and USA. 
Sam Poyser 
Sam Poyser is a senior lecturer in applied criminology at 
Canterbury Christchurch University, Kent. She has been 
researching in the area of miscarriages of justice for the 
past six years and specialises in the media’s involvement in 
miscarriages of justice. 
Dr Hannah Quirk 
Hannah Quirk is a lecturer in criminal law and justice at the 
University of Manchester. She worked for four years as a 
case review manager at the Criminal Cases Review Commis-
sion, including six months on a research sabbatical at the 
Innocence Project New Orleans. Before that she was senior 
researcher at the Legal Services Research Centre (the re-
search unit of the Legal Services Commission). 
Michael Mansfield QC
Michael Mansfield was called to the Bar in 1967, established 
Tooks Court Chambers in 1984 and took silk in 1989. He 
has written extensively in all major broadsheets and law 
journals and he has appeared in several documentaries. 
He is the president of Amicus, Haldane Society of Socialist 
Lawyers and National Civil Rights Movement. 
Louise Shorter 
Louise Shorter is a freelance television producer, director 
and writer with 15 years’ experience of criminal justice 
issues. She was a producer on the BBC’s Rough Justice 
programme for ten years before it was axed. In 2010 she 
set up Inside Justice, a not-for-profit miscarriages of justice 
investigative unit funded by the Esmee Fairbairn Founda-
tion, the Michael Newsum Charitable Trust and Inside Time.
Alastair R MacGregor QC
Alastair R MacGregor QC was called to the English Bar in 
1974 and became a QC in 1994. He joined the Criminal 
Cases Review Commission in 2004 and has been its deputy 
chairman since 2006.
Maslen Merchant
Maslen Merchant is a legal executive with Hadgkiss Hughes 
and Beale Solicitors in Birmingham with more than 20 
years’ experience in criminal law. He specialises in miscar-
riages of justice work. He is also an accredited police station 
representative.
Jon Robins
Jon Robins is a freelance journalist who runs www.
thejusticegap.com. He is also a director of the specialist 
legal research company Jures. His work has appeared 
regularly in The Times, The Observer, The Guardian and 
the Financial Times. He has written several books including 
The Justice Gap: Whatever happened to legal aid? He edits 
The Justice Gap series.
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No going back
Michael Mansfield QC There was a time when the sight of an envelope addressed to me in green ink, as though written studiously along a 
ruler’s edge, with each letter truncated in line, 
signified one thing – a plea from prison. It was 
another inmate aggrieved by an unfair system 
and a wrongful conviction. 
In those days (the 1970s and ‘80s) there was a 
limited number of ways to mount an effective 
challenge to a conviction, especially once the 
Appeal Court had rejected any approach on 
traditional grounds concerned with points 
of law and decisions by the trial judge. 
Uncovering fresh evidence, either evidence that 
was available at the time but was unknown, or 
evidence that has arisen since the trial, was a 
bridge too far in the normal run of cases. 
A possible opening lay with the Home 
Office C3 Department. This took forever and 
was mostly unsuccessful. Another was via the 
good offices of sympathetic lawyers – solicitors 
and barristers. At one time I was receiving a 
dozen requests per week. As a one man band 
it was impossible to take on the enormity of the 
task, which to be done properly would require 
prison visits, retrieval of trial papers, fresh 
research and analysis, and tracing witnesses 
old and new – all to be undertaken without 
funding. 
There were one or two organisations that 
attempted to fill the gap, notably ‘Justice’ under 
the energetic and relentless investigative spirit 
of Tom Sargent. His case load was unimaginable 
“The force that shook  
the long-standing and 
entrenched bastions  
of the law was the 
power of investigative 
journalism”
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and insurmountable. He was, however, the lone 
forerunner and trailblazer of those who came 
later to pick up the baton marked ‘miscarriages 
of justice’.
I believe the force that shook the long-
standing and entrenched bastions of the law 
was the power of investigative journalism. It 
had both resources and courage. Successive 
members of the higher judiciary took umbrage 
from Denning to Lords Lane and Taylor. They 
considered the television programmes to be an 
affront to the systems of justice undermining 
public confidence. Grotesque attempts 
were made to besmirch the journalists’ 
efforts by alleging underhand methods and 
unprofessional practice. These were the 
desperate last-ditch ploys to deflect from 
the central malaise, which was an uncritical 
acceptance and belief in the rectitude of a 
system that had for too long permitted a form 
of noble cause corruption. It took initiatives like 
Rough Justice with Peter Hill, Trial and Error with 
David Jessel (later a CCRC commissioner) and 
Yorkshire Television’s World in Action to unravel 
notorious miscarriages encased in layers of 
misplaced assumption and malpractice. Prime 
among them was the Birmingham Six and the 
discovery that playing cards could give rise to 
spurious positive results for explosive traces. It 
was blind justice itself which had undermined 
public confidence, not the inquisitive journalist.
As a result the Runciman Commission 
was set up and after its report the CCRC was 
established in Birmingham, as was a separate 
one for Scotland. For the first time since the 
criminal Courts of Appeal were established 
in both jurisdictions at the start of the 20th 
century on the back of miscarriages brought 
about by serious misidentification, there was to 
be a permanent body whose function it was to 
investigate potential wrongful convictions.
The commission is empowered to do this 
either on its own motion or upon application, 
and to refer such cases back to the Court of 
Appeal if it concludes there is a ‘real possibility’ 
the conviction would be overturned. Even if the 
preconditions for referral are not satisfied they 
may still do so in ‘exceptional circumstances’. 
Stretched to the limit
The commissioners combined with caseworkers 
have provided a formidable advance on 
what has happened before and the 
significance of this should not be undervalued. 
Nevertheless, as it has grown so have a number 
of problems.
Evidential unreliability has shifted from 
identification and confession evidence to 
“It was blind justice itself 
which had undermined 
public confidence, not the 
inquisitive journalist”
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the complexity and speed of forensic science 
developments. This is an expensive and time-
consuming area that requires intimate and up-
to-the-minute expertise.
The size of the case load itself has not eased 
and once more resources are stretched to their 
limit. This has revealed a weakness in the system 
that has echoes in the past. The commission has 
to sort out the deserving from the undeserving 
among a plethora of applications. As ever, 
presentation and focus are consummate aids 
to this exercise. It requires considerable skill 
and the help of legal advisers to assemble 
and submit a dossier at a stage where there is 
once again little or no funding. The result is a 
situation redolent of pre-CCRC days where 
sympathetic lawyers and a few voluntary 
organisations have stepped into the breach. For 
example, Paddy Hill (ex-Birmingham Six) and 
Mojo, and Michael Naughton with his network 
of ‘Innocence project’ based at UK universities. 
Despite their excellent efforts they by no means 
meet the need.
Above all the commission has had the diffi-
cult, if not impossible, task of trying to second 
guess the Court of Appeal and the likelihood 
of success in order to cross the threshold for 
referral. To begin with the commission’s work 
was welcomed but then judicial criticism be-
gan to surface particularly where cases were 
old. Over the last decade, however, it has been 
possible to detect a worrying trend towards a 
more robust and less flexible approach to fresh 
evidence. While the statute which governs the 
Court of Appeal makes it clear that it is their de-
cision alone and that it is for them to determine 
whether they ‘think’ a conviction is safe they 
have increasingly adopted the stance of a trial 
court rather than a court of review. 
As Lord Devlin repeatedly pointed out this 
is dangerous in a system that has entrusted 
the jury in serious cases with the primary task 
of adjudicating upon the facts. The Court of 
Appeal will never be able to reconstruct the 
effect of much of the trial evidence, which will 
only be available on paper.
The ‘jury impact’ test, as it has been termed, 
by which the Court of Appeal, which assesses 
whether a reasonable jury properly directed 
might have reached a different verdict, is be-
ing marginalised and relegated to the status 
of a potentially useful but not an essential tool. 
This is occurring both at the admission and the 
substantive stages of a hearing. 
The CCRC needs to be supported and ex-
panded. There can be no return of the iniqui-
ties of pre-history. There is a strong reaction-
ary lobby that should not be underestimated, 
which embrace the doctrine ‘prison works’ and 
regards prisoners as almost sub-human merit-
ing few facilities and heaven forbid the right to 
vote. It is this lobby that no doubt would prefer 
to see the demise of the CCRC. This must be 
resisted. 
“The commission has 
had the difficult, if not 
impossible, task of 
trying to second guess 
the Court of Appeal and 
the likelihood of success 
in order to cross the 
threshold for referral”
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Unrealistic expectations
Alastair R MacGregor QC is deputy chairman of  
the Criminal Cases Review Commission
No  reasonable commentator would deny that the current system some-times fails victims of miscarriages of 
justice. Nor would they deny that it is the duty 
of all concerned with miscarriages to press for 
improvements to that system. But the mere fact 
that improvements can and should be made to 
the existing arrangements and to the commis-
sion’s role within them cannot sensibly lead to 
the conclusion that some wholly new approach 
is necessary. 
In its 14 years of operations the commission 
has dealt with almost 13,500 applications. Each 
has been considered and decided by a commis-
sioner who has explained his or her reasoning 
to the applicant; none has been rejected with-
out the applicant being given an opportunity 
to make further representations. More than 480 
convictions or sentences have been referred to 
appeal courts and of the 455 appeals decided, 
320 have succeeded. 
Though mainly involving serious crimes, 
the cases referred have ranged from murder 
to traffic offences, and from those that have at-
tracted widespread support to those that have 
generated little interest or sympathy. The only 
constants are that all have been alleged miscar-
riages of justice, that all have been important 
to the applicants concerned, and that all have 
been addressed by the commission with ob-
jectivity, thoroughness and care. Furthermore, 
after six years of cuts in its budget and person-
nel, the commission’s waiting lists, while still 
as unacceptable to it as they are to others, are as 
short now as they have ever been. 
The commission makes no claim to perfec-
tion. It does, however, suggest that those who 
express concerns about its role and perfor-
mance should first acknowledge its consider-
able achievements. 
Any institution that rejects criticisms of its 
performance or calls for its reform is likely to 
be accused of excessive defensiveness and/or 
of Panglossian complacency. Both charges have 
been levelled at the commission and there may 
sometimes have been some force in the first of 
them. Any charge of complacency is, however, 
unjustified. 
Throughout its existence the commission has 
been engaged in an almost constant process 
of self-analysis, self-improvement and reform. 
None of its critics is more committed to rem-
edying miscarriages of justice or to optimising 
the process for doing so. 
What then of the criticisms that have been 
made of the commission and of its role? 
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The commission doesn’t care about 
factual innocence
Of course the commission cares about factual 
innocence. Nothing is more likely to lead to 
a commission referral than compelling new 
evidence of factual innocence. The commission 
looks for such evidence whenever and wherever 
it is sensible and practical to do so. Evidence of 
that type is, however, rarely discoverable and 
in its absence the commission has no greater 
gift than others for identifying those of its 
applicants who are factually innocent.
Though campaign groups and journalists 
understandably focus on the convictions of 
those they believe to be factually innocent, 
the commission has a wider remit.  It works to 
overturn not only the wrongful convictions of 
those who others believe to be innocent, but 
also the wrongful convictions of those who 
only might be innocent (though others doubt it) 
and even, indeed, of those who, whatever the 
evidence of their guilt, have been convicted only 
after substantial systemic error or wrongdoing. 
Few victims of miscarriages can hope to 
prove their factual innocence and many will 
lack supporters who believe in them. Their 
‘victimhood’ is not diminished by that fact and 
it cannot be assumed that their applications 
are in consequence less meritorious. The 
commission makes no apology for concerning 
itself not only with the convictions of those 
who others believe to be innocent, but with 
all wrongful convictions and with the need 
to keep the system ‘clean’ and, by doing so, to 
reduce the risk of future injustices.
The ‘real possibility’ test is too 
restrictive
The ‘real possibility’ test was not devised 
by the commission: it is the test established 
by Parliament. Those who disapprove of it 
“Nothing is more likely 
to lead to a commission 
referral than compelling 
new evidence of factual 
innocence. The commission 
looks for such evidence 
whenever and wherever  
it is sensible and practical 
to do so”
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must provide a convincing response to the 
question: ‘What useful purpose would be 
served by the commission being entitled to 
refer convictions to appeal courts where there 
is no real possibility that those convictions will 
be quashed?’ 
Only two responses to that question 
appear to be at all compelling. The first is that 
miscarriages of justice are such an evil that, 
where one is suspected, even a mere ‘outside 
chance’ of a successful appeal should be 
sufficient for a referral. Whatever the force of 
that argument, however, it takes little account 
of political or economic realities or of the fact 
that, as discussed below, unsuccessful referrals 
are not a ‘cost-free’ option.
A second and more compelling argument 
against the ‘real possibility’ test is that it makes 
life too comfortable for the Court of Appeal. At 
least on occasion, so it could be contended, the 
commission should have the power to make 
a ‘contrarian’ referral which obliges the court 
publicly to confront and address the concerns 
that exist in relation to a case and/or to look 
again at some issue or principle on which it has 
already expressed a concluded view. 
On the face of things, such a power would 
institutionalise the scope for conflict between 
the court and the commission and, on any 
view, it is one that could properly be exercised 
only in the most unusual of circumstances. 
It is, moreover, by no means easy to find 
examples of past cases where the commission 
might appropriately have exercised such a 
power. Even so, a sensible case could be made 
for extending the commission’s powers by 
allowing it “in exceptional circumstances and 
where it considers it to be in the interests of 
justice to do so” to refer a conviction even when 
it cannot persuade itself that there is a real 
possibility that the court will quash it. 
The commission is overcautious 
Given that the commission has power to refer 
a conviction to the Court of Appeal only if it 
is satisfied there is a real possibility that that 
court will quash it, the criticisms that are made 
of the commission in respect of non-referrals 
are often criticisms that ought more sensibly to 
be directed at the court. 
Equally, however, there have presumably 
been occasions when the commission has been 
overcautious when applying the ‘real possibil-
ity’ test and when it has, as a result, failed to 
refer convictions that, if referred, might well 
have been overturned.
Recognising the seriousness of the 
consequences that may flow from an 
overcautious application of the ‘real possibility’ 
test, commissioners are of course sometimes 
tempted to refer convictions that seem to have 
only an outside chance of being quashed. They 
resist that temptation both because it would be 
improper for them to do otherwise and because 
they also recognise – as others sometimes fail 
to – that the referral of cases that are doomed to 
failure can cause real damage.
 Such referrals may cause unnecessary 
and serious distress to victims of crime who 
have long since tried to put behind them the 
trauma of the relevant events. Pain of that sort 
must not be belittled or underestimated. They 
may also cause real distress to applicants and 
their families by raising hopes that are then 
disappointed. 
One of the more outspoken passages of 
adverse criticism that the Court of Appeal has 
directed at the commission was in the case of 
Gore [2007] EWCA Crim 2789 where, on the 
application of her parents, the commission 
referred a conviction for infanticide of a young 
woman who had later died. The court said: 
“We are surprised that the commission should 
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have seen fit to refer this case to us. This was 
not a case where the system failed a distressed 
defendant. On the contrary, it was a case where 
a young woman was treated with considerable 
compassion and sensitivity. She never wanted 
to resurrect this matter and it is unfortunate 
that, given there can be no benefit whatsoever 
to her, her parents’ expectations have been 
raised only to be dashed. They should have 
been left to grieve for their daughter, not forced 
to relive the tragic circumstances of the death 
of their grandchild.”
In the particular circumstances of that 
case, this was not in the Commission’s view 
a fair criticism. The thrust of the underlying 
reasoning could, however, undoubtedly have 
been compelling in other circumstances.
Other factors that militate against making 
referrals that stand no real possibility of 
success arise out of the fact that, when a referral 
is made, the court is obliged to treat it “for all 
purposes” as an appeal in the normal way (see 
e.g. section 9(2) of the 1995 Act). That aspect of 
the legislation is as remarkable as it is central 
to the commission’s ability to assist in the 
remedying of miscarriages of justice. 
Whether or not an appeal court wishes to 
do so – and no matter what other pressures 
there may be on its time – it must deal with a 
commission referral as a substantive appeal. 
Given that cases that are referred by the 
commission are often of real weight and 
complexity, the resulting burden on appeal 
courts and its consequences for other appellants 
can be very substantial. In those circumstances 
it takes little imagination to see why the Court 
of Appeal might be quick to take exception to 
speculative or unrealistic commission referrals. 
Nor is it difficult to imagine how the court 
might react if it came to the view that there was 
a real risk that referrals of that nature might 
“Given that cases that are 
referred by the commission 
are often of real weight 
and complexity, the 
resulting burden on appeal 
courts and its consequences 
for other appellants can be 
very substantial. In those 
circumstances it takes little 
imagination to see why the 
Court of Appeal might be 
quick to take exception to 
speculative or unrealistic 
commission referrals”
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undermine its ability properly to discharge its 
duties to other appellants. 
In the infanticide case referred to above, 
the court also observed that “the Commission 
might have been well advised to heed the wise 
words of Kay LJ in the appeal of Ruth Ellis [2003] 
EWCA Crim 3556”. Those words included: “If 
we had not been obliged to consider [this] case 
we would perhaps in the time available have 
dealt with eight to 12 other cases, the majority 
of which would have involved people who 
were said to be wrongly in custody. The Court 
of Appeal’s workload is an ever increasing one 
and recent legislation will add substantially 
to that load. Parliament may wish to consider 
whether going back many years into history 
to re examine a case of this kind is a use that 
ought to be made of the limited resources that 
are available.” 
Both Gore and Ellis were to some extent 
‘historic’ cases and that factor no doubt 
contributed to the court’s displeasure. The 
commission is perhaps less inclined than is the 
court to the view that wrongs should be left 
unrighted merely because time has passed. It 
seems unlikely, however, that the court would 
be any more enthusiastic if the commission 
were to refer significant numbers of more 
recent cases that stood no sensible prospect of 
success. 
In 2006 and 2007 the Court of Appeal 
expressed concerns about referrals that had 
been made to it by the commission on so-called 
‘change of law’ grounds. By May 2008 – and 
after “members of the senior judiciary brought 
the matter to the attention of the government” 
– legislation had been introduced, which in 
effect provided that commission referrals on 
such grounds need no longer be treated “for all 
purposes” as appeals in the normal way. 
If more general legislation were introduced 
to the effect that commission referrals need no 
longer be dealt with as substantive appeals but 
merely as applications for permission to appeal, 
the consequences for the wrongfully convicted 
could be serious indeed.   
To recognise that there can be downsides 
in the making of over-ambitious referrals is 
neither to run scared of ambition nor to be 
excessively in thrall to the Court of Appeal. It is 
simply to recognise the realities of the situation 
and, in particular:
  that under the existing system it is only the 
Court of Appeal – and not the commission 
– that can actually remedy miscarriages of 
justice; 
  that, as every advocate knows, one’s ability 
to influence a court is largely dependent 
upon the extent to which that court respects 
and trusts one’s good faith and judgement;
  that the commission’s power to require 
the Court of Appeal to consider a case 
as a normal appeal must be coupled with 
a responsibility to exercise that power 
sensibly, in good faith and with proper 
concern for the interests of others who have 
a right to call on the court’s time; and
  that if that important power is abused, 
there is good reason to fear that it may be 
lost altogether.
The commission doesn’t make sufficient 
use of its investigatory powers
The commission cannot sensibly reinvestigate 
every aspect of every case which comes before 
it. It does, however, make extensive use of its 
investigatory powers and will in virtually 
every case obtain relevant material from public 
bodies. Although there have no doubt been 
occasions when the commission could and 
should have made further investigations than 
those it has in fact conducted, the most pressing 
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investigatory problems relate not so much to 
the commission’s use of the powers it already 
possesses but rather to the investigatory 
powers that it still lacks.
For years the commission has been pressing 
for the power - which is already enjoyed by the 
Scottish CCRC - to obtain material from private 
as well as public bodies and for an (appropri-
ately qualified) right to require witnesses to an-
swer its questions. 
The need for such powers has grown as 
functions have been transferred from the pub-
lic to the private and/or charitable sectors, and 
as legislation about data protection has led to 
increased concerns about confidentiality. The 
desirability of transnational investigatory pow-
ers has also become ever more apparent as the 
years have passed. 
There must always be a much greater chance 
that a wrongful conviction will be over-
turned by even the most conservative and 
recalcitrant of appeal courts if the commis-
sion can present compelling new evidence of 
‘unsafety’. The commission would welcome 
any alteration to the present arrangements 
that would make it easier for it to find such 
evidence. 
Different roles
Journalists, pressure groups, academics and 
others have vital roles to play in uncovering 
miscarriages of justice, in drawing them to 
public attention and in keeping up to the mark 
those who are charged with investigating and/
or remedying them. The commission has a 
different role to perform. It is a public body 
expending public funds that must review each 
application as a potential miscarriage. It does 
not have the luxury of choosing the cases with 
which it engages or of ignoring those that do 
not evoke its sympathy.
Convictions will be overturned only if the 
Court of Appeal can be persuaded that, on 
a proper analysis of the available evidence 
and the law, they are unsafe. In those 
circumstances it is both proper and inevitable 
that the body charged with investigating 
alleged miscarriages will focus on the evidence 
and the law, and that it will give little weight 
to emotional declarations or campaigning 
fervour. Equally, however, it will not hesitate 
to make challenging referrals when it can 
properly do so.
The commission is one of only three bodies 
of its type in the world. In it we have the most 
powerful apparatus anywhere for identifying 
and dealing with miscarriages of justice. Its 
considerable powers allow it to make a real and 
important contribution to the remedying of 
such miscarriages. 
Wider powers and more generous resources 
would undoubtedly enable it to make an even 
greater contribution. But those who argue that 
the commission or its model is fundamentally 
flawed and that there is need for a wholly 
different approach to miscarriages of justice 
should be watchful that, in an inevitably 
imperfect world, they do not undermine the 
good in their illusive search for the best – and 
in consequence end up with neither. 
“There must always be  
a much greater chance 
that a wrongful conviction 
will be overturned  
by even the most 
conservative and 
recalcitrant appeal courts”
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Time to reconnect
David Jessel is an investigative journalist and a former 
commissioner at the CCRC
The CCRC is not the body we campaigned for. It never was. Most of us who, in the eighties, were concerned with miscar-
riages of justice had a vision of an independent 
court of last resort, which could cut through the 
intransigence shown by the Court of Appeal in 
cases such as the Birmingham Six and the mur-
der of Carl Bridgewater.
That didn’t happen. Parliament, instead, 
came up with a formula whereby the CCRC 
had the power to send a conviction back to the 
Court of Appeal, while the court alone had the 
power to quash it. The linkage lay in the 1995 
statute’s provision that the CCRC could refer 
only when there was a ‘real possibility’ that the 
court would quash the conviction. 
‘Real possibility’ was the wicked fairy at the 
christening of the CCRC, and the more sen-
sible critics of the commission usually end up 
identifying this baptismal curse as its principal 
problem, rather than any institutional coward-
ice, sloth or mutton-headedness. It was a po-
litical compromise with a judiciary jealous of 
their own rights and suspicious of a bunch of 
amateurs in Birmingham set up to mark their 
homework. 
It would be quixotic – and no service to the 
CCRC’s applicants – to send up cases where 
there was no real possibility of a successful out-
come. It would be idle, too, to base appeals on 
a mere belief in innocence, based on the same 
‘evidence of innocence’ that a trial jury found 
implausible – the route apparently favoured by 
some Innocence projects. But the CCRC’s obli-
gation to second guess the Court of Appeal in-
evitably puts its judgments at an extra remove 
from justice and truth, and holds its applicants 
hostage to the vagaries of a court whose very 
failings were largely responsible for the crisis 
that brought forth the CCRC. 
The issue of shaken baby syndrome is a case 
in point. A recent shoulder-shrugging Appeal 
Court judgment ducked the issue, making it 
harder for the CCRC to refer such cases in the 
future. But campaigners know that only con-
stant pressure and sustained challenge forces 
the court to adapt. The present formula con-
spires against the need to keep hammering on 
the door of the Court of Appeal in cases such 
as Anthony Stock or Eddie Gilfoyle, where the 
whole landscape of the original prosecution has 
changed beyond recognition.
Playing the villain
The CCRC as a creature of statute presents an-
other problem for campaigners. Concern with 
miscarriages of justice is an obsessive pursuit. 
Ludovic Kennedy, Paul Foot, Peter Hill, Tom 
Sargent, Bob Woffinden and both the Duncan 
Campbells – these are people whose passion, 
commitment and anger I recognise. I hope I 
used to have some of it myself. The creation of 
the CCRC, however, was seen as the nationali-
sation of zeal, the taking of fervour into public 
ownership. There are passionate and committed 
people at the commission, but, right from the 
start, the CCRC made it clear that it was not a 
campaigning organisation. It was a system, a 
mechanism – and it’s hard to detect the heart-
beat in a machine. 
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That’s perhaps why the CCRC is widely – and 
unfairly – seen as the institutional villain of the 
piece, just as in our day we identified the police 
and the judges as the ‘forces of evil’. Campaign-
ers need a bit of hate. The CCRC didn’t help it-
self by maintaining on its website that it was not 
concerned with guilt or innocence but with the 
safety of convictions, mistakenly assuming that 
it would be obvious to anyone with an IQ great-
er than that of a coral sponge that the conviction 
of an innocent person is by definition unsafe. 
The CCRC’s role as the central clearing house 
of miscarriages further alienates it from more 
familiar champions of justice. Most campaigns 
are based on individual cases – Susan May’s, 
for instance, or Jeremy Bamber’s. As campaign-
ers we didn’t always agree on the merits of each 
other’s cases – but everyone can cheerfully unite 
to excoriate the CCRC when it knocks both cases 
back. 
The CCRC rejects 96 per cent of its cases. Just 
as Dickens’ optimistic Mr Micawber would 
“just wait for something to turn up”, the CCRC 
was always doomed to be caricatured as a grim 
institution just waiting for someone to turn 
down. Internally, too, there’s the danger of mis-
carriage fatigue when the umpteenth no-hoper 
of the month thuds onto your desk. Sometimes 
it can feel as if you began with a concern for asy-
lum seekers, and ended up as an immigration 
officer. It always struck me as strange, coming 
from the trebles-all-round world of the telly, 
that successful referrals were not celebrated in 
any corporate sense at the CCRC; the manage-
ment view is that to do so would undervalue the 
efforts of those whose work tirelessly in produc-
ing non-referrals. 
Against a background of year-on-year cuts 
the pressure for more efficient case closure will 
intensify. Already, an early exercise in forensic 
triage rejects roughly half of the intake at an ear-
ly stage. There’s a perfectly respectable utilitar-
ian justification for heroically scything through 
what appear to be unpromising applications – it 
clears the decks for the more deserving cases. 
But judgement and productivity – Solomon 
and Stakhanov – do not make easy bedfellows. 
These early rejects can’t be described as having 
had the benefit of a thorough review. Often the 
applicant’s letter alone forms the basis for rejec-
tion, on the grounds that he hasn’t appealed, or 
that he has furnished no plausible grounds to 
justify a review. But the innocent applicant of-
ten doesn’t know what grounds he can plead – 
he won’t know that his accuser is a serial liar, 
for instance – or has obediently followed his 
barrister’s advice that there’s no prospect of a 
successful appeal. We know that this can be an 
inconsistent process, because the occasional re-
ject has reapplied, and has had his case success-
fully referred.
Passion killer
Managing the mountain of applications can 
lead to a preoccupation with process, targets 
and performance indicators. But following the 
trail of a possible miscarriage of justice is an 
innately inefficient exercise, wandering down 
unpromising forensic avenues and refusing to 
take no for an answer. When case closure is one 
of the criteria in assessing staff performance, 
where’s the incentive to go the extra mile? Do 
the very processes necessity has forced on the 
commission dampen, dissipate and diminish 
the passion to identify the wrongly convicted? 
A candid reappraisal of what the commis-
sion can and cannot do is overdue – before the 
CCRC’s enemies seize their opportunity fur-
nished by economics and ideology. 
For example, can the CCRC continue to be 
the universal safety net of criminal justice? 
Should access to the commission be restricted 
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to those cases that meet strict public interest 
criteria, set by parliament, rather than the com-
mission? These might include the exclusion of 
people who are no longer alive, cases that in-
volve minor or even non-custodial sentences, or 
applicants appealing on the grounds that their 
five previous offences have no bearing on their 
sixth. I could argue against all or any of these 
exclusions, but I’d rather the CCRC concentrated 
its resources on a nurse wrongly accused of at-
tempted murder, or an elderly music teacher 
maliciously charged with sexually abusing a 
pupil, than in seeking to identify irregularities 
in the latest conviction of a serial drug dealer, or 
taking up the cause of a prisoner who has never 
shown any inclination to take it up himself. 
The CCRC could abandon its ambition dras-
tically to shorten its waiting lists. We all know 
about justice delayed being justice denied, but 
the backlog is the result of matters outside the 
commission’s control – its applicants and its 
funded resources. If the price of thoroughness 
is delay, the commission should not have to 
choose between doing its job right or doing it 
quickly.  
The cab-rank principle should also be reas-
sessed; high-profile cases (Sally Clark, Barry 
George) don’t achieve that status by accident. 
Cases where positive and credible new work 
has been achieved by students, journalists, cam-
paigners or other interested parties should be 
prioritised – a huge and quick win to re-involve 
the CCRC with the constituency of campaign-
ing concern.  
Priority should also be given to cases where 
the application is based on quickly verifiable 
grounds, such as the revelation of previous dis-
honesty by the police, witnesses or complain-
ants, or developments in forensic science. 
Applications based on points of law should be 
hived off to a separate specialist secretariat; the 
CCRC was not put on earth to pick over deficient 
judicial directions over inferences from the ac-
cused’s silence at interview. Resources should 
be channelled more to knocking on doors, less 
to anatomising precedents.
Rescue mission
These modest proposals would go some way to 
rescue the commission from the burdens that 
stifle its true mission, impart an honest trans-
parency to its workings, and help it to reconnect 
with, and maybe refresh, public concerns with 
miscarriages of justice. It would mean that the 
CCRC spends more of its time on investigating 
troubling cases, and less in processing the cases 
of those who have been safely convicted. And 
why not scrap the ‘real possibility’ formula and 
take a lesson from the Scottish Commission, 
which refers on the basis of a belief that a mis-
carriage of justice has occurred, and that it is in 
the public interest to send it back to the court? In 
the name of independence and accountability, a 
body set up to identify miscarriages of justice 
should do what it says on the tin – refer cases 
where it thinks justice has miscarried. 
The CCRC could, of course, go on as it is. But 
it runs the risk of becoming a shadow of what 
it was set up to be. The CCRC is an inherently 
good thing, and better than anything else on of-
fer. But it will need help – and the candid advice 
of campaigners – to survive, and to justify its 
survival.
“The CCRC is an inherently 
good thing, and better 
than anything else on  
offer. But it will need help”
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No champion of justice
Michael Naughton is a senior lecturer at the University of Bristol 
and founder and director of the Innocence Network UK (INUK)
When the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) was an-nounced, following a recommen-
dation of the Royal Commission on Criminal 
Justice (RCCJ), prominent organisations such as 
JUSTICE and Liberty gave up providing case-
work assistance to alleged innocent victims of 
wrongful conviction on a belief that voluntary 
efforts were no longer necessary. In fact, the 
‘blueprint’ offered by JUSTICE for the CCRC 
was seen as the reform solution to the problem 
of the wrongful conviction of the innocent that 
it had long fought for. 
The CCRC also resulted in a decrease in 
media and political interest amid widespread 
celebration that we now had a state-funded 
and supposedly independent public body to 
deal with miscarriages of justice should they 
arise and that efforts could be applied to more 
pressing areas of social justice need.
However, the CCRC is not the panacea to 
the problem of wrongful convictions that was 
widely believed as it is shackled to the criteria 
of the appeal courts – which stifles its claimed 
independence. As such, rather than assisting 
the innocent to overturn their convictions, it 
can be argued that it has set the cause against 
wrongful convictions back by raising the 
threshold for alleged innocent victims of 
wrongful convictions, which many of them will 
never be able to reach. What follows evaluates 
how the CCRC operates as a post-appeal remedy 
against miscarriages of justice. It shows that 
further reforms are urgently required to assist 
innocent victims to achieve justice.
The CCRC’s notion of safety
Public statements by senior personnel at 
the CCRC repeatedly claim that it cannot 
concern itself with whether applicants against 
convictions are innocent or guilty, but, rather, 
applies a test that seeks to determine whether 
alleged miscarriages of justice are likely to be 
unsafe along the lines of the requirements for 
quashing convictions in the appeal courts. This 
approach determines how the CCRC reviews 
alleged miscarriages of justice, seeking to show 
that the evidence (fibres, fingerprints, hairs 
and so on) that led to a conviction is unreliable 
and, therefore, that a conviction may be unsafe 
before it considers whether to refer a case back 
to the relevant appeal court. However, the 
CCRC is quick to remind us that that doesn’t 
prove that an alleged innocent victim of the 
wrongful conviction is, in fact, innocent. Yet, 
the story continues that fewer innocent people 
would be freed if the legal criterion that they 
worked to was provable innocence rather than 
unsafety of conviction.
Taken on face value this seems to make 
logical sense. Without a crystal ball, in most 
alleged wrongful convictions, save those rare 
cases where DNA proves factual innocence, it is 
just not possible to know if the alleged victim 
is innocent or guilty. But, the CCRC’s notion of 
safety needs unpacking to demonstrate how it 
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fails to assist alleged victims of miscarriages of 
justice who may be innocent.
First, it might be thought that the CCRC’s 
notion of safety of convictions would relate 
to the factual reliability or otherwise of the 
evidence that underpinned the conviction. 
However, the standard of safety applied by the 
CCRC is not an objective one. Rather, section 
13(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 requires 
the CCRC to only refer cases back to the relevant 
appeal court if there is a ‘real possibility’ that 
the conviction will not be upheld – i.e. that 
it will be quashed. As such, the CCRC is not 
independent as claimed. Instead, it is best 
viewed as a gatekeeper for the appeal courts. It 
is always in the realm of trying to second-guess 
how the appeal courts may deal with any cases 
that are referred back. And all decisions made 
need to be understood within this context.
Further, section 13(1)(b) of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995 restricts the CCRC to 
consider, except in exceptional circumstances, 
only evidence or argument not raised in the 
proceedings that led to the conviction or on any 
previous appeal or leave to appeal. This means 
that even in cases where there is a credible claim 
of innocence the CCRC is unlikely to refer the 
conviction if the evidence of innocence is not 
fresh and it, therefore, does not think that the 
conviction will be overturned.
A key consequence of the requirement that 
the CCRC restrict itself to fresh evidence is 
that it is often helpless when confronted with 
applications in which applicants argue that they 
are innocent and the evidence against them at 
trial was unreliable. For instance, a judge may 
decide at trial that a potentially unreliable form 
of evidence is admissible, such as an eye-witness 
identification that was obtained in breach of 
PACE that was known before trial. If a jury, 
having heard all of the arguments and given a 
Turnbull direction, still decided to convict the 
CCRC would not be able to go behind the jury’s 
verdict even though the conviction might be 
factually unsafe and the applicant may, in fact, 
be innocent.
Similarly, in cases involving expert evidence, 
if an applicant is able to find additional experts 
post-appeal that support the defence case at 
trial, the CCRC will tend not to see the case as 
having a real possibility in the appeal courts 
as the arguments are not new, even though 
the applicant might be innocent and there is 
sound scientific evidence to substantiate the 
applicant’s claim.
This is all the more problematic in light 
of the legislative changes outlined above as 
inherently unreliable forms of evidence are 
increasingly seen as admissible in criminal 
trials. Crucially, if wrongful convictions are 
obtained in accordance with due process and 
without any procedural irregularity, despite the 
unreliability of the evidence, the CCRC’s lack of 
independence from the judiciary means that it is 
unlikely to be able to rectify them.
This reveals how the CCRC undertakes its 
reviews of alleged miscarriages of justice. It 
does not tend to undertake thorough inquiries 
to investigate whether the evidence that led 
to the conviction is reliable or to seek out new 
scientific techniques that may positively prove 
whether an applicant is innocent. Rather, 
‘desktop reviews’ are, generally, undertaken to 
identify those very rare cases (in a statistical 
sense based on the number of applications that 
it receives and refers) that may contain fresh 
evidence and may be overturned by the appeal 
courts.
Reforms needed
In addition to dealing with alleged wrongful 
convictions, the CCRC also deals with a range of 
p20 to p22_SJ_Miscarriages.indd   21 3/6/2012   10:23:32 AM
no champion of justice
Wrongly accused?22 solicitorsjournal.com
other issues such as sentence matters, technical 
miscarriages of justice such as cases where 
murder convictions should be quashed on the 
grounds of diminished responsibility, and cases 
that might be deemed more trivial such as road 
traffic offences and destruction orders under the 
Dangerous Dogs Act 1991.
However, alleged wrongful convictions by 
those who claim to be factually innocent were 
the driving force behind the establishment of 
the CCRC. Infamous cases such as the Guildford 
Four and the Birmingham Six induced a public 
crisis of confidence in the entire criminal 
justice system, prompting the RCCJ, which 
recommended the establishment of the CCRC, 
to allay concerns that innocent people were 
unable to overturn their convictions.
Yet, the foregoing critique of the CCRC’s 
operations is intended to illustrate just how far 
it is detached from its public mandate to assist 
those who may be genuinely innocent victims 
of wrongful conviction. And, although it can be 
legitimately argued that this is not the fault of the 
CCRC, which is required by statute to perform 
the functions that were remitted by parliament, 
it remains equally true that the CCRC remit and 
mode of operation are in need of reform if it is to 
be a truly independent body to assist innocent 
victims of wrongful conviction.
First, the CCRC needs to be independent 
from the appeal courts. The ‘real possibility’ 
test has to be removed and the CCRC should be 
able to refer any cases in which it believes that 
a wrongful conviction of an innocent person 
might have occurred, referred to as actual 
innocence claims in the United States.
Second, this would have a knock-on effect 
in terms of the CCRC’s remit of how it reviews 
alleged wrongful convictions, which should 
not be restricted to fresh evidence. Akin to 
public enquiries, this would entail thorough 
reinvestigations, as opposed to paper reviews, 
of the credibility of evidence, whether in 
the form of witness testimonies or scientific 
evidence, to get to the bottom of whether claims 
of innocence are valid.
Third, the CCRC must be permitted to 
acknowledge that forms of evidence, even if 
deemed to be admissible by trial judges, are 
potentially unreliable and that juries make 
mistakes. 
These points were made in the reports by the 
RCCJ and JUSTICE (Remedying Miscarriages of 
Justice) almost 20 years ago but are yet to be put 
into effect.
Fourth, all referrals by the CCRC should be 
deemed to be first appeals; that is, they should 
be afforded the same status as the powers of 
the home secretary’s under section 17 of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 under the previous 
system for reviewing alleged miscarriages of 
justice. This would free the CCRC from the 
current fresh evidence criteria and further 
enable it to operate independently and to refer 
cases of applicants thought to be innocent in the 
wider interests of justice.
From past experience, successive CCRC chairs 
and commissioners have not been receptive 
to critiques of its limitations in assisting the 
innocent. Rather than openly acknowledging its 
statutory straightjacket it has promulgated the 
idea, both in the UK and around the world, that 
it is a state-sponsored innocence project and a 
champion of justice. 
This guise is increasingly unsustainable as 
more alleged victims of wrongful conviction 
who have been let down by the CCRC despite 
having plausible claims of innocence come to 
the fore and expose its inherent defects.
 
Many thanks to Gabe Tan for her assistance  
with this essay
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Out of step
Campbell Malone is chair of the  
Criminal Appeal Lawyers Association
In March 2010 I was invited by the Criminal Cases Review Commission to address their stakeholders’ conference on the issue 
of the effectiveness of the commission from 
a practitioner’s prospective, and this piece 
largely follows the concerns I raised at that 
meeting.
I do so with some hesitation because from my 
experience the CCRC is a well-intentioned body 
comprised of a large number of individuals 
working collectively with a commitment 
to correcting injustice. Nevertheless, the 
commission has attracted criticism from a 
variety of sources and there is little doubt that 
it is operating in a very different climate from 
the one that saw its creation.
It arose out of the Royal Commission set 
up in 1995 following a series of high-profile 
miscarriages of justice that had rocked public 
confidence in the administration of criminal 
justice. 
By the time it started work in 1997, things 
were starting to change and, under Tony 
Blair, New Labour set about addressing what 
they saw as a lack of balance in the criminal 
justice system. Bizarrely they seemed to find it 
necessary that to protect the victims of crime 
those affected by a miscarriage of justice could 
safely be disregarded. 
Progressively over a number of years the 
CCRC has found itself under pressure from the 
relevant government departments and in recent 
years its budgets have been slashed. The result 
is a body that is currently demoralised, and it is 
significant that it has not sought to replace the 
two commissioners who most recently retired.
It has been unjustly criticised by those 
who complain that it is not interested in the 
innocence or otherwise of the applicants and 
applies the wrong test in determining whether 
or not to refer a case back to the Court of Appeal. 
It is clear that it can only apply the test imposed 
upon them by the legislation and that it would 
in any event be pointless to refer cases back to 
the Court of Appeal where there is absolutely 
no prospect of the case being successfully 
appealed. In my experience the commission 
has always been ready to use forensic evidence 
if it could realistically lead to the exclusion of 
an applicant as being the perpetrator, but, after 
all, it is only in a small percentage of cases that 
such an outcome might be feasible.
“Bizarrely they seemed 
to find it necessary that 
to protect the victims 
of crime those affected 
by a miscarriage of 
justice could safely be 
disregarded”
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As a result I am worried that in the current 
climate it may be seen as an easy way to save 
money to get rid of the commission in the 
face of the complaint that it is not discharging 
its function and return it to the fold of the 
Ministry of Justice. Those of us who remember 
having to deal with C3 within the Home Office 
and the concern about political interference in 
the decisions as to whether or not a case should 
be referred view such a possibility with horror. 
Nevertheless the legitimate concerns about 
the commission need to be ventilated. The 
commission has always been prepared to 
listen to criticism. The extent to which it might 
be affected by that criticism remains an open 
question.
I raised a number of issues with the 
commission arising out of my dealings with 
them on behalf of my clients at the stakeholders’ 
conference. For example, I found it surprising 
that, when dealing with an application based on 
fresh evidence, the commission should regard 
negative comments from prosecution experts 
as being conclusive grounds for rejecting the 
application. Even more startling were the 
occasions when the commission instructed 
an expert who agreed with the opinion of the 
applicants’ new expert evidence only for the 
commission to decline to refer on the grounds 
that the issues raised were not new. Why then 
incur the expense? 
Not enough cases?
Practical concerns raised included a variable 
approach to communicating with applicants 
ourselves and to disclosure of material 
unearthed during their investigation, but the 
concern really boils down to the number of 
cases referred. It is perhaps unremarkable that a 
practitioner will complain that the commission 
does not refer enough cases. The Court of 
Appeal probably feels that the commission 
refers too many cases and the commission 
probably believes that they get it just about 
right.  None of that may be surprising but the 
fact remains that historically the commission 
has only referred about four per cent of the 
cases submitted to them and have had a success 
rate of something like 65 to 70 per cent, which 
they regard as a vindication. 
Many practitioners believe that they do not 
refer enough cases and that they do not always 
refer the right cases. Some of the cases that are 
referred and are unsuccessful are unsuccessful 
because the nature of the case develops during 
the period that the case is waiting to be heard. 
More evidence comes to light that enables the 
Court of Appeal to safely dispatch it. That is not 
something for which the commission can be 
held responsible. Those cases that should not 
be referred are dispatched with even greater 
swiftness by the court and the court would 
usually make it known to the commission 
what they considered about its merits. That 
has obvious value to the commission in that 
it serves as an audit for their decision-making 
process. 
Misunderstanding the court
The problem is with those cases that are not 
referred by the commission, and I have been 
particularly concerned with decisions taken 
by the commission not to refer a case where 
fresh evidence, particularly expert evidence, 
is involved based on its view of the court’s 
powers under section 23 of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968. This section gives the court 
the discretion to admit evidence before it, if it is 
in the interests of justice to do so. In exercising 
that discretion the court would normally have 
regard to the four criteria set out in the section, 
in essence that the evidence should: (a) address 
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the issue of the safety of the conviction; (b) 
be credible; (c) be admissible; and (d) within 
reason, not have been available at the time of 
trial. I believe that the commission has often 
misunderstood how the court would be likely 
to interpret and apply those powers.
In its statement of reasons explaining its 
decision not to refer, the commission often 
mentions a couple of judgments of the Court 
of Appeal to argue that the court would not 
receive the evidence proposed (R v Steven Jones 
[1997] 1 Cr App 86 and R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] 
EWCA Crim 1092).
One case rarely mentioned by the 
commission is R v Cairns [2000] Crim LR 473, 
where the Court of Appeal was prepared to 
admit fresh expert evidence despite the absence 
of any reasonable explanation for the failure to 
call such evidence at trial. The court adopted an 
approach that, as the fresh evidence indicated 
that the conviction was unsafe, the interests 
of justice required that it admit it. That 
approach was consistent with the wording of 
section 23 of the 1968 Act, which makes it clear 
that the interests of justice are the overriding 
consideration. 
Common sense and discretion
The truth is that in the appropriate cases the 
Court of Appeal has shown itself ready to 
exercise its discretion and admit evidence even 
though all of the criteria of section 23 are not 
met (for example, Henretti [2002] CR App PR419 
and Richardson, 9 May 1991).
The judgment in R v CCRC ex p Pearson [1999] 
3 ALL ER 498 is almost certainly quoted in 
probably every statement of reasons issued by 
the CCRC because, in it, Bingham LJ spelt out 
the power of the commission to refer and its 
obligation to make a judgement on the case’s 
prospects of success including, to be fair, the 
likelihood or otherwise of the Court of Appeal 
receiving “fresh evidence”.
Rarely quoted, however, is that part of 
the judgment where Lord Bingham quoted 
Richardson and said: “It seems clear that by 1991 
the court had come to recognise, even in an 
extreme case of this kind, the paramount need 
to ensure that a conviction was safe,” or where 
he restated the principle that: “The overriding 
discretion conferred on the court enables it to 
ensure that, in the last resort, defendants are 
sentenced for the crimes they have committed 
and not for the psychological failings to which 
he may be subject.”
No one is saying other than the criteria of 
section 23 set out the guidelines which normally 
would be applied by the Court of Appeal but 
what these cases demonstrate is that the court 
will apply common sense when considering 
an application and above all will be guided 
by their sense of justice and will not prevent 
a wrongful conviction from being overturned 
simply on the basis that the evidence that 
“The commission 
sometimes makes 
decisions that are not 
irrational or unlawful but 
just plain wrong, having 
come down on the wrong 
side of the fence when 
it comes to the decision-
making process as to the 
realistic likelihood of the 
Court of Appeal quashing 
the conviction”
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undermines the safety of that conviction could 
have conceivably been called at an earlier stage.
Overly cautious
It is for that reason that I believe the commission 
has so far often been out of step with the 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal and 
have been overly cautious in their approach 
to fresh evidence cases, particularly those 
involving expert witnesses. I should add that 
the criticism is not limited to cases involving 
expert evidence and applies, for example, to 
cases where critical new evidence points to an 
alternative suspect.
I suspect the commission will disagree and 
will point to its track record in relation to 
judicial review, the only challenge available 
to an unhappy applicant whose case has not 
been referred by the commission. The case 
of Pearson made it clear that the power in 
determining whether or not a case should be 
referred lies exclusively with the commission 
and the commission would point to the fact 
that it was only in the one case where they 
were successfully judicially reviewed. While 
true it ignores the fact that a number of judicial 
review applications are lodged and in many of 
those cases the commission itself will review 
its decision and will seek to compromise the 
matter by taking further appropriate steps. 
It is perhaps significant that in the one 
case successfully reviewed the basis of the 
criticism of the commission was that it had 
fundamentally misunderstood the approach 
the Court of Appeal would be likely to take.
Avoiding bad decisions
So we have a system in place via the court itself 
when they refer incorrectly. The commission 
would acknowledge that inevitably it makes 
mistakes and commissioners in the past have 
accepted that they felt the commission is too 
conservative. 
Obviously there also needs to be finality and 
the decision-making process of the commission 
allows further submissions to be made once an 
initial decision not to refer it has been made, 
but I am concerned that there is no inbuilt 
review system to pick up those cases where 
the commission has decided not to refer and 
the decision is not susceptible to challenge in 
the Administrative Court. The commission 
sometimes makes decisions that are not 
irrational or unlawful but just plain wrong, 
having come down on the wrong side of the 
fence when it comes to the decision-making 
process as to the realistic likelihood of the 
Court of Appeal quashing the conviction.
I believe therefore that it would be a useful 
process (useful for the commission as well) for 
there to be a random sample audit of a small 
number of cases that have been considered by 
a panel of three commission members but not 
referred. My understanding of the procedure 
of the commission is that decisions to refer on 
borderline cases are taken by such a panel.
If negative decisions by such a panel were 
subject to a random review carried out by 
independent leading counsel or a retired judge 
then weaknesses of the kind that I have tried 
to highlight might be exposed, inconsistencies 
might be eliminated and those bad decisions 
that leave miscarriages of justice unresolved 
averted.
“The commission has  
often misunderstood  
how the court would be 
likely to interpret and 
apply those powers”
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Time to tackle injustice
Vera Baird QC is former Solicitor General, Glyn Maddocks is a so-
licitor at Gabb & Co and Emily Bolton is an associate with Reprieve
At about 10.30pm on Sunday 22 July 1990, two young black men shot dead the owner of the GNH stores at 155 
Lower Clapton Road, Hackney, in course of an 
attempted robbery. Four months later, 20-year-
old Oliver Campbell was arrested because 
the gunman had worn a distinctive ‘British 
Knights’ cap, which had once belonged to Oli-
ver and which was found near the GNH stores 
in a side street. He was put on an identification 
parade. Three witnesses including the mur-
dered man’s son failed to pick him out but the 
son then changed his mind after a conversation 
with a policeman. There was also a weak iden-
tification by a passer by. But the key evidence 
was the confession that Oliver made in his po-
lice interview.
Oliver has severe learning difficulties. His 
intelligence is ‘borderline defective’ with an 
impaired capacity to process or remember more 
than the simplest verbal information. Despite 
this, there was no lawyer present in the police 
station and his answers were suggested by lead-
ing questions, some of which were at odds with 
the known facts and some of which were ab-
surd. When he had legal assistance Oliver with-
drew his confession and was adamant that he 
was not guilty, but he was convicted of murder 
at the Old Bailey in December 1991.
All of the forensic evidence, far from link-
ing him to the crime, exculpated him. The fin-
gerprints found on the counter, the shop door 
and on a beer can carried by the gunman were 
not his and neither were two hairs found in the 
British Knights baseball cap. Furthermore, Eric 
Samuels, his co-accused, admitted taking part 
in the robbery and told the police from the start 
that Oliver was not there and was not, as the po-
lice alleged, the gunman.
Oliver got nowhere in the Court of Appeal, 
and he served 11 years of a life sentence and was 
released on licence in 2002.
After that his case attracted the attention of 
the BBC’s Rough Justice programme, who paid for 
extra medical reports and further investigations 
and who covertly taped Eric Samuels once again 
confessing to the crime and confirming that Oli-
ver was not involved. Oliver has a team of ex-
perienced lawyers, including a leading criminal 
QC, who has worked pro bono for many years, 
spearheading cogent and detailed submissions 
to the CCRC and then seeking a judicial review 
when they refused to refer the case back to the 
Court of Appeal. Even with such help Oliver’s 
conviction has not been quashed. His support-
ers are currently attempting to obtain more 
fresh evidence to launch yet another application 
to the CCRC.
Familiar story
This case is neither unusual nor surprising. It 
is an all too familiar story to criminal law prac-
titioners. While the facts of each case vary, the 
errors that produce outcomes like this are very 
common. 
In the 12 years since the CCRC launched, 
p27 to p29_SJ_Miscarriages of Justice.indd   27 3/6/2012   10:25:20 AM
time to tackle injustice
Wrongly accused?28 solicitorsjournal.com
criminal lawyers have become involved in 
putting together coherent legal cases for some 
CCRC applicants to get a better chance of seri-
ous attention from the CCRC. Rarely can a pris-
oner afford good-quality legal representation, 
and publicly funded legal help is poorly paid 
and is restricted in scope and quantity. The 
London rate of £49.70 per hour has not changed 
since 2001 and payment is not made until the 
end of the case, which, as Oliver Campbell’s 
case makes clear, is often not for many years. 
There remain a few practitioners around the 
country who are still sufficiently committed or 
financially reckless enough to take on the of-
ten thankless task of trying to overturn false 
convictions, but the number is dwindling, and 
given the current economic climate there can be 
little confidence about how much longer public 
funding for this sort of work will survive.
Members of the public not involved with the 
workings of the UK criminal justice system find 
it hard to believe that people are still wrongly 
convicted. The received view is that there are 
inbuilt safeguards to avoid errors; that guilt is 
always established beyond reasonable doubt 
following a full and fair trial in which all of 
the evidence that could possibly influence the 
outcome has been painstakingly examined and 
that if there is any doubt the Court of Appeal is 
there to rectify injustice or error.
Limited resources and expertise
The CCRC potentially has the power to under-
take a fresh investigation and is tasked with 
looking at whether anything was missing or 
mismanaged in the original trial and/or if some-
thing fresh has come to light since. However, its 
resources are becoming more and more limited, 
and, with more than 1,000 cases a year to pro-
gress, it faces an almost impossible task in un-
dertaking the depth and level of investigation 
that is required in all but a very few of them.
The fact that the CCRC is an independent 
body may sound desirable to a convicted pris-
oner cynical about courts and state institutions. 
However, the CCRC is also independent of the 
prisoner and so not subject to the same duty 
to him as his own lawyer. Further, a study by 
Warwick University, referred to later, identi-
fied a lack of defence expertise at the CCRC, 
where many of the personnel come from a law 
enforcement background and, as a result, are 
not attuned to defence issues and defence inves-
tigation methodology. We have an adversarial 
system and the Crown continues to be partisan, 
interested in upholding convictions. It is vital 
therefore to have a lawyer working for the ap-
plicant, on whom the burden of rectifying the 
miscarriage of justice can be extremely high.
The University of Warwick carried out a re-
search project in 2008, examining the extent and 
impact of legal representation on applicants to 
the CCRC and ensuing outcomes in the Court 
of Appeal
It found that only one third of applicants to 
the CCRC are legally represented and applica-
tions where lawyers were involved were almost 
twice as likely to contain successful submis-
sions. The study also discovered that an un-
represented applicant is significantly disadvan-
taged when challenging a CCRC decision not to 
refer a case to the Court of Appeal. Given that 
the CCRC only refers just over three per cent of 
the cases it reviews, this represents the vast ma-
jority of CCRC applicants.
The implication from the Warwick research is 
that at least some of the 600 or so unrepresented 
people of the 1,000 who apply to the CCRC each 
year should have a lawyer if they are to have a 
better chance of successfully overturning their 
conviction. That is also the experience of prac-
titioners. Most typically the CCRC needs fresh 
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evidence to refer a case. Interviewing potential 
witnesses and reinvestigating crime scenes re-
quire the work of experienced legal profession-
als and investigators.
Such investigative and legal work is complex 
and requires insight into both trial and appel-
late processes. They have to start with very little 
and work out what steps are necessary, first to 
ascertain whether there may be a case to pursue. 
Those few victims who are lucky enough to 
find quality representation have an enormous 
advantage over the vast majority who attempt 
to overturn their convictions by themselves. It 
is probably right to say that anything less than 
this quality of representation will be insuffi-
cient. Working one’s way back to the essence of a 
case after it has had a number of hearings, many 
lawyers, and it has gone in many directions, is 
a highly skilled task. Anyone without very sub-
stantial experience of criminal appeals will just 
add another layer and will do more harm than 
good.
Action stations
To fill this very real justice gap a number of pro-
grammes have begun. University-based Inno-
cence projects, the Innocence network and a few 
private law firms and media-based initiatives 
such as the miscarriage of justice unit at Inside 
Times are doing what they can. However, there 
is nothing that brings together the level of ex-
pertise necessary. In response to this a number 
of specialist lawyers already involved in crimi-
nal appeals are developing a new way of engag-
ing with the problem. The intention is to create a 
not-for-profit, multi-disciplinary specialist legal 
centre – the Centre for Criminal Appeals (CCA) 
(www.criminalappeals.org.uk) to support such 
cases and to try to engage in data collection re-
search and analysis to pinpoint the principal 
ways in which these cases indicate that our jus-
tice system is failing some accused people.
The CCA’s case work will focus on obtaining 
new facts rather than considering simply the le-
gal issues. The CCA will also review cases with 
mixed issues of facts and law and utilise advice 
from specialist counsel with appellate experi-
ence to guide and direct the investigations. 
There will be a dedicated team of investigators, 
with forensic and other specialist scientists to 
take the work forward. With a centralised op-
erational headquarters, but with specialised 
consultant lawyers located regionally, the CCA 
intends to be positioned to provide high stand-
ards of investigation and legal representation 
to those who may have been victims of unsafe 
convictions.
The initial intention is to establish a two-year 
pilot to proof the proposal. The aim is to demon-
strate to public and private funders that a spe-
cialised, not-for-profit legal centre, with a case 
investigation focus, can provide a cost-effective 
solution to the shortage of quality legal repre-
sentation in this field. The pilot project will use 
public funding where available, but its data col-
lection, analysis and consequent potential to in-
form future criminal justice policy on the most 
frequent systemic failings will be underwritten 
by grant funding from the private sector. By the 
end of the two years a sustainable and appropri-
ately combined public/private funding model 
should be achieved.
Those of us involved in this project have been 
very encouraged at the positive response re-
ceived from all sections of the legal profession 
and the wider community to this proposal, and 
we are very keen to hear from and receive fur-
ther support (practical or otherwise) from indi-
viduals, organisations or anyone else who can 
assist us in fulfilling our ambition of enabling 
everyone who has suffered an injustice to have 
the benefit of the highest quality representation.
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Governing in prose
Hannah Quirk is a lecturer in criminal law and justice at  
the University of Manchester
“You campaign in poetry. You 
govern in prose.” (Mario Cuomo, 
governor of New York)
A fter long political conflicts or revo-lutions are over, those who fought on the winning side often find the 
mundanity of ordinary government business 
unfulfilling when compared to the certainties 
and moral purpose of their previous strug-
gles. So it has proved with those campaign-
ing against miscarriages of justice after the 
establishment of the Criminal Cases Review 
Commission (CCRC), the first state-funded or-
ganisation in the world to investigate wrong-
ful convictions. The criminal justice system has 
changed radically in the last 25 years, mostly 
for the better; suspects have more rights since 
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and 
police practice has improved enormously. Ap-
peals now tend to be based on lack of certainty 
in the guilty verdict rather than an assertion of 
innocence. 
There are dangers of complacency or of for-
getting the damage miscarriages of justice do 
both to the individuals concerned and to public 
confidence in the system. The political debate 
has moved from concerns about convicting the 
innocent to fears that ‘rebalancing the system’ 
has tipped too far in favour of ‘criminals’. Fun-
damental principles such as the right of silence 
have been eroded and successive governments 
have sought to restrict the legal aid budget. 
Such changes are more insidious and are less 
likely to galvanise opposition than dramatic 
decisions at the Court of Appeal, nevertheless 
resisting them is essential if the system is to op-
erate to the highest standards. 
In order to be effective, campaigners against 
miscarriages of justice must change their ap-
proach, recognise the gains that have been 
made, and not allow these to be eroded while 
they are busy preparing to fight the last war. 
The CCRC sought and received little attention 
in the early years. Now in its adolescence, it is 
experiencing budget cuts and increased public 
scrutiny. This essay explores why the CCRC 
was such a remarkable innovation, assesses 
some of the criticisms it faces and offers options 
for further reform.
The CCRC was one of the few widely praised 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Justice 1993. It was established on the 
day the Birmingham Six had their convictions 
quashed of the IRA bombing of two pubs in 
1975. After their appeals were rejected in 1976, 
the only way the Court of Appeal could recon-
sider their case was if the home secretary re-
ferred it. In 1988 the Court of Appeal dismissed 
their second appeal in robust terms. Following 
further enquiries, it was referred again and 
their convictions were overturned on 14 March 
1991.
There was a sense among reformers that the 
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criminal justice system was at a critical point, 
with a series of miscarriages of justice be-
ing overturned in short order (including the 
Maguire Seven and Tottenham Three in 1991; 
Stefan Kiszko and Judith Ward in 1992, the 
Taylor Sisters in 1993). By the time the Royal 
Commission reported, the prevailing political 
climate had changed in favour of the Michael 
Howard-Tony Blair competition to be ‘toughest 
on crime’. Nevertheless, it was recognised that 
the existing system for correcting mistakes was 
inadequate and inappropriate. The Home Of-
fice unit charged with investigating these cases 
had limited resources and expertise. Political 
involvement in individual cases contravenes 
the separation of powers between the judici-
ary and executive. The home secretary faced 
potential conflicts of interest as he had ministe-
rial responsibility for the police, who may have 
been criticised in appeals. Such decisions are 
also difficult for an elected politician as these 
cases often arouse strong public opinion. The 
decision to pass such cases to an independent 
body received widespread approval.
Remarkable innovation
The CCRC was established by the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1995 and began work in 1997. The 
CCRC was a remarkable innovation; an inde-
pendent public body established to investigate 
wrongful convictions and the appropriateness 
of sentences. It currently has a staff of around 
80, an annual budget of almost £7m, and the au-
thority to refer cases directly to the appropriate 
court. It can require access to relevant material 
held by any public body; it also has power to di-
rect the police to carry out investigations on its 
behalf. Legal aid is available to applicants seek-
ing judicial review of the commission’s work, 
and applicants are free to reapply if their cases 
are turned down. Other jurisdictions have ad-
mired the work of the CCRC and commissions 
have been established in Scotland and Norway. 
The CCRC receives around 1,000 applica-
tions a year. It refers just under four per cent of 
applications; of these around 70 per cent have 
the conviction quashed or varied, or the sen-
tence altered. The CCRC has discretion in refer-
ring cases and it is important that it exercises 
its judgment robustly. Some have criticised the 
CCRC for not referring ‘enough’ cases. Such 
criticisms have tended to be non-specific and 
this is an impossible assessment to make with-
out detailed knowledge of each case. Referrals 
are made by a committee of at least three com-
missioners but cases can be turned down by a 
single decision maker. Publication of the state-
ments of reasons (the decision-making docu-
ment completed for each case) might go some 
way towards addressing these concerns. Publi-
cation could offer a useful resource to research-
ers interested in the area, make the process 
more transparent and allow for trends in its de-
cision making to be observed. Names could be 
redacted in sensitive cases, as happens in Court 
of Appeal judgments.
The criticism of some commentators that the 
CCRC does not care about the ‘innocent’ is spe-
“Campaigners against 
miscarriages of justice 
must change their 
approach, recognise the 
gains that have been 
made, and not allow these 
to be eroded while they 
are busy preparing to 
fight the last war”
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cious. The CCRC does not look at ‘innocence’ 
but considers only if there is a ‘real possibility’ 
that the Court of Appeal will find a conviction 
unsafe; that is its statutory remit. The Court of 
Appeal listens to the new evidence or argument 
offered by the appellant and considers whether, 
if the jury had heard this, it would still have 
been certain to have convicted. If the court is 
not certain that the jury would have convict-
ed – even if it thinks the jury probably would 
have done so – then the conviction should be 
declared unsafe. The presumption of innocence 
means that, if a conviction is quashed, the indi-
vidual is legally innocent even if, in cases such 
as that of the M25 Three, the Court of Appeal 
has stated that the conviction is being quashed 
solely because of irregularities in the prosecu-
tion case. 
Some have argued that this focus on legal 
technicalities means that the CCRC might not 
refer a case of somebody factually innocent but 
no examples have been given of such a case. 
(The CCRC can refer a case in ‘exceptional cir-
cumstances’ in the absence of new evidence 
or argument, but it has not yet done so.) Those 
wrongly convicted who are ‘factually innocent’ 
may find this technocratic remedy unsatisfac-
tory but the test of unsafety is more widely pro-
tective than a test of innocence. In the absence 
of DNA evidence or a video recording, it is al-
most impossible to establish innocence. 
Missing the point
After the CCRC was established, organisations 
such as JUSTICE announced an end to their 
casework on miscarriages of justice, and televi-
sion companies lost interest in Rough Justice and 
Trial and Error type programmes. The CCRC 
has been criticised for causing the demise of 
grassroots campaigns against miscarriages of 
justice; yet this seems to miss the point. These 
groups had been a response to the inadequacies 
of the system, which have now been remedied. 
The CCRC took over the casework function of 
these groups, but it has a different role. It does 
not act for applicants; if it refers a case, it takes 
no part in the appeal, applicants must instruct 
their own representatives. Campaign groups 
and journalists had some notable triumphs but 
could work on the cases of only a tiny propor-
tion of those claiming to have been wrongly 
convicted. Some equally deserving cases never 
got the oxygen of publicity.
Anybody can have their case considered 
by the CCRC regardless of their wealth, con-
nections or campaigning abilities. Access to 
justice should not depend on these factors. In-
vestigations into historic sex abuse cases, for 
instance, are potentially a great source of injus-
tice but are complicated cases where the truth 
is often unknowable and will not make good 
television. At a time when state functions are 
being delegated to the Big Society, this is one 
responsibility that is too important to be left to 
volunteers. (It should also be remembered that 
society can be one of the causes of wrongful 
convictions when the police are under public 
pressure to ‘solve’ high-profile crimes quickly.) 
“The CCRC has become 
more open in recent 
years, allowing academic 
research, engaging with 
campaign groups, running 
conferences and recently 
allowing journalists 
to observe committee 
meetings”
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If the state imprisons individuals, it has a duty 
to investigate where doubts are raised about a 
conviction. As a solicitor once remarked to me: 
“This work is too important to be left to a bunch 
of meddling kids and a Great Dane!”
The CCRC is supposed to act to improve 
public confidence in the criminal justice sys-
tem. This is one area in which it has not done 
enough. It has tended to focus on individual 
cases rather than using its unique perspective 
to draw conclusions at a systematic level. In the 
early days, it said that its case sample was too 
small, atypical and covered too great a time pe-
riod for any useful analysis to be undertaken. It 
might equally be argued that these are the only 
cases subject to such an in-depth post-convic-
tion review and could offer lessons for individ-
ual police officers, lawyers, or expert witnesses 
if they are still serving. The CCRC has become 
more open in recent years, allowing academic 
research, engaging with campaign groups, 
running conferences and recently allowing 
journalists to observe committee meetings.
Delicate position
While groups such as Liberty and JUSTICE 
speak out about potential causes of miscar-
riages of justice, such as extended periods of 
detention without charge in terrorism cases, or 
cuts to police station legal advice, the CCRC is 
in a delicate position. It is a non-departmental 
public body, but it relies on the Ministry of Jus-
tice for its funding. It also has an awkward re-
lationship with the Court of Appeal, which has 
the ultimate say in determining the outcomes 
of cases. The CCRC could speak with authority 
about the risk factors for miscarriages of jus-
tice, but there are dangers if it appears partisan 
when one of its strengths is its neutrality. If it 
is seen by the police and prosecution as pro-
applicant, this may damage working relation-
ships and its ability to investigate cases. It is 
vital, however, to maintain public confidence 
in its independence from others in the criminal 
justice system. While it should remain disin-
terested in its investigations, it should never be 
uninterested in the causes of wrongful convic-
tions. By making more of its material publicly 
available and producing thematic reports, ei-
ther in house or via academics, its experience 
could inform these debates.
There should be some responsibility within 
the criminal justice system for alerting poten-
tial applicants. The CCRC has not been proac-
tive in seeking applications. This could be an 
onerous duty where, for instance, an expert 
witness or technique is discredited, or the 
pending decision regarding those interrogat-
ed without legal representation in Northern 
Ireland. In the sudden infant death syndrome 
cases, the Solicitor General’s Office screened all 
the possible cases before passing them onto the 
CCRC. This seemed to be an ad hoc decision, 
but one which would seem a more appropriate 
role for the CCRC. 
Since the safeguards introduced by the 
PACE, there have been few clear-cut miscar-
riages of justice. It would be wrong to suggest 
that serious mistakes no longer occur but these 
seem more likely to arise from mistakes rather 
than misfeasance. Emerging from the cam-
paigns around cases such as the Birmingham 
Six, the CCRC finds itself engaged mostly in 
routine, worthy but essential work. 
The creation of the CCRC marked a new 
stage in criminal justice and new measures 
are necessary to mark its achievements and to 
hold it to account. “Governing in prose” may 
lack the excitement and certitudes of previous 
campaigns, but, when recalling what happened 
in those cases, we should be grateful not to live 
in “interesting times”. 
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Up to the job
Ralph Barrington is a former CCRC investigator
Critics of the commission say that it is not really up to doing its job. It is suggested that the wrongfully convicted are being 
failed by the criminal justice system and a new 
approach is required. I don’t understand these 
arguments. The commission cannot respond to 
public criticism about its decisions in individual 
cases and it is not easy for it to deal with general 
comments suggesting that it has become ineffec-
tive and ought to be replaced. My recent retire-
ment has allowed me to say something about 
life at the commission and how it approaches its 
work. I hope that I can make a useful contribu-
tion to the debate by shedding some light on the 
realities of dealing with alleged miscarriages of 
injustice.  
The Criminal Appeal Act 1995 set up the com-
mission, sets out its functions and gives it the 
powers to do its job. The Act provides the statuto-
ry test for referrals of convictions to the Court of 
Appeal – generally there must be new evidence 
or new argument which in the commission’s 
view raises the real possibility that, if referred, 
the conviction would not be upheld. A significant 
number of applicants are ineligible  or are judged 
to have no reviewable grounds.
Cases accepted for review are allocated to a 
case review manager (CRM) who will carry out 
the necessary work. The first thing to do is to 
identify the issues raised and if possible agree 
them with the applicant (and legal representa-
tive). This is often a relatively straightforward 
process, but in some cases applicants make vo-
luminous submissions which can be poorly writ-
ten and which can take a great deal time to distil 
down to a workable list of issues to address. 
In the majority of cases the CRM finds no ba-
sis upon which a referral could be considered 
and a single commissioner makes the decision. 
The CRM prepares a draft provisional statement 
of reasons (PSOR) for the single commissioner 
to consider. The draft PSOR will list the issues 
raised by the applicant and explain what the 
commission has actually done during the course 
of the review. It then responds to each issue ex-
plaining why in its provisional view a referral 
cannot be made. 
Once the single commissioner concludes that 
the review has been satisfactorily completed and 
a non-referral is the right decision, the PSOR is 
sent to the applicant (and legal representative). 
The applicant is given an opportunity to make 
further representations. If none are made the 
case will be closed. Many applicants do make 
further representations and these are carefully 
considered before a final decision is made. 
Where the CRM finds that there is a basis on 
which a referral could be considered the case 
goes before a committee of three commissioners. 
A single commissioner will also ask for a com-
mittee to consider a case if not entirely satisfied 
that a non-referral is the right decision. Many 
cases are far from straightforward and commit-
tees will often ask for further enquiries to be car-
ried out before a final decision is made.  
Developments in forensic science
My job at the commission was to advise on in-
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vestigation work. It always helps if the truth can 
be established, but opportunities to do so are 
quite rare. Rapid strides have been made in the 
development of forensic science and especially 
with DNA. Where an applicant says he is inno-
cent and forensic science could potentially assist 
his case the commission will arrange for further 
testing. There have been a few spectacular suc-
cesses but somewhat surprisingly there has also 
been the odd case where an applicant has asked 
for a test to be conducted that has only served to 
confirm his guilt. 
In murders and other serious crimes there may 
be a number of unidentified finger marks found 
at the crime scene. It is only in relatively recent 
times that it has been possible to run a computer 
check nationally to try to identify these marks. 
Where the Crown’s case was strong, new evi-
dence to show that at some time someone with a 
criminal record was in the particular premises or 
vehicle is not likely to help very much. If, though, 
the Crown’s case was circumstantial with no 
direct evidence of guilt, then it is theoretically 
possible that a finger mark, unidentified at the 
time of the original investigation, could now be 
shown to belong to someone with a propensity 
to commit the very crime for which the applicant 
has been convicted. Where this theoretical pos-
sibility exists national checks are made, but I can 
only recall one case where the identification of a 
previously unidentified crime scene finger mark 
threw up a potential new suspect. 
Child sex abuse cases
Child sex abuse represents a significant propor-
tion of the commission’s cases. These are difficult 
cases. Offences committed by strangers are nor-
mally reported at the time, but those committed 
within a family or in a care home are sometimes 
not reported for years. There is rarely any inde-
pendent evidence and so at trial it comes down 
to the victim’s word against that of the alleged 
offender. Victims often come from very troubled 
backgrounds and some children are good at 
telling lies. The words of denial from the guilty 
defendant when claiming to be innocent are the 
same words used by the truly innocent defend-
ant facing a false allegation. The jury has to de-
cide who is telling the truth and who is not and 
they are bound to get it wrong sometimes.
Full disclosure by the prosecution is crucial in 
child sex abuse cases. If the victim’s background 
is fully disclosed and any relevant matters have 
been raised by the defence the jury will know 
all that it should know about the victim when 
deciding whether to accept his or her evidence. 
The commission is in the unique position of be-
ing able to use its powers under the Act to check 
to see if all relevant information has, in fact, 
been disclosed. Social services files are routinely 
checked. Sometimes undisclosed material is 
found, which in the commission’s view would 
have assisted the defendant’s case at trial and 
ought therefore to have been disclosed. 
The question of social services files on chil-
dren is a difficult one. Social services depart-
ments rightly regard their files as highly con-
fidential. Judges, it seems, will not allow the 
defence to go on so-called ‘fishing expeditions’ 
and yet that is exactly what the commission does. 
The non-disclosure of relevant material is rarely, 
if ever, deliberate, but busy social workers and 
police officers do not always see the relevance 
of some material. The commission, by inspect-
ing the social services files relating to the victim, 
does something the defence cannot do and this 
will occasionally lead to a referral. It seems a 
little odd that the commission has the power to 
find material post trial, which if disclosed at trial 
might have led to a different verdict and possibly 
to no prosecution at all. I doubt that there is an 
easy answer to this, but it must be better to avoid 
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an unfair conviction than put it right some years 
later. 
Some of the checks that the commission rou-
tinely makes in child sex abuse cases are also 
carried out in sex cases with adult victims. The 
commission will routinely check the files of 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Author-
ity (CICA). There have been one or two cases 
referred, where, in the application to CICA, the 
victim has exaggerated what actually occurred 
to such an extent that, in the commission’s view, 
had the jury known this it might not necessar-
ily have accepted the victim’s evidence. Victims 
of sexual offences are also checked through a 
national police system designed to make infor-
mation held by one police force available to all 
police forces. This system was apparently intro-
duced to address the failings identified by the 
enquiry into the Soham murders. In a case where 
the applicant has been convicted of, for example, 
‘date rape’, it is now possible for the commission 
to check whether the victim has made any other 
allegations of this kind. Before the introduction 
of this system it was possible for a man to be con-
victed of rape without anyone knowing that his 
victim had previously made what was accepted 
to have been a false allegation of rape in another 
part of the country.  
Drug trafficking
Persons convicted of drug trafficking receive 
very long sentences and also represent a sig-
nificant proportion of commission cases. In 
many cases the applicant will not have been 
found in possession of drugs or large amounts 
of cash. The Crown’s case will often be based 
on observed meetings and records of telephone 
contact between the key players. Each applicant 
will raise his or her own particular issues and, 
where investigation is possible, and appropriate, 
enquires are made. 
Applicants in these cases often claim that 
there has been some form of undisclosed skul-
duggery on the part of the investigators, which, if 
true, would render their conviction unsafe. They 
will, for example, allege that an unauthorised 
participating informant has been used. The com-
mission is usually able to establish how the oper-
ation against the applicant and his co-defendants 
began and how it developed right through to the 
trial. The commission can look into the deepest 
secrets of the investigators to check that all is as 
it should be. While the commission is never in 
a position to vouch for the honesty of the covert 
side of a policing operation, its enquires will take 
it to a position where it can say that it is satisfied 
that there is no evidence of wrong doing and, just 
as importantly, no reason to believe wrong doing 
has occurred. 
In its early days the commission dealt with a 
series of cases where lack of adequate disclosure 
to the court about the role played by participat-
ing informants involved in the importation of 
heroin led to a number of referrals and success-
ful appeals. These cases apart, referrals in seri-
ous drug trafficking cases have been rare.  
Section 19 investigations 
Section 19 of the Act gives the commission the 
power to require a chief officer of police to ap-
point an investigating officer to make enquiries 
to assist the commission. This power, which is 
exercised by a committee of three commission-
ers, has only been used on 43 occasions in 14 
years. Some commission reviews require the 
investigation of matters that might involve the 
commission of offences such as perjury and/or 
perverting the course of justice. The police have 
the responsibility and powers to investigate pos-
sible criminal offences. Individuals, in a vari-
ety of circumstances, have been interviewed as 
suspects by the police as part of a commission 
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review. Commission employees are not respon-
sible for the investigation of suspected offences 
and therefore cannot administer a Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) caution. 
Some of the section 19 investigations insti-
gated by the commission have been very large, 
have lasted a long time and have cost the force 
concerned a great deal of money. Others have 
been much shorter. The low number of section 
19 investigations suggests that this is a route the 
commission takes only when considered abso-
lutely necessary. While this is probably true, the 
need for police involvement to get the necessary 
enquiries made is always the deciding factor. In 
the commission’s early days some high-profile 
referrals followed a section 19 investigation, and 
at one stage in the commission’s history 50 per 
cent of section 19 cases had led to a referral. Al-
though referrals from section 19 cases still occur, 
the referral rate has dropped in recent years. I am 
satisfied though that the lower referral rate is not 
in any way related to the quality of police inves-
tigations, but is simply due to the nature of the 
individual case themselves. 
Retracting witnesses
In a relatively small number of cases the applica-
tion involves a suggestion that a prosecution wit-
ness has made or is prepared to make a retraction 
of their trial evidence. Most, but by no means all, 
retraction cases relate to child sex abuse within 
a family. Retracting witnesses have to be inter-
viewed in an effort to determine which of the 
two versions given is true. The need to interview 
a retracting witness presents the commission 
with something of a problem. The commis-
sion has no responsibility for the investigation 
of criminal offences, but does this mean that it 
can simply interview an unrepresented witness 
knowing that the witness might admit perjury? 
One view is that the commission’s business is in-
vestigating possible miscarriages of justice and it 
needs to find out exactly what the retracting wit-
ness has to say. It should not have to worry about 
any form of warning against self-incrimination. 
The opposing view is that the commission is a 
responsible public body that should not be inter-
viewing unrepresented witnesses without, at the 
very least, suggesting that legal advice be sought. 
The commission basically has three options: 
it could chose to interview a retracting witness 
without worrying about the implications of an 
admission of perjury, it could instigate a section 
19 police investigation, or it could make an ap-
proach to the Crown Prosecution Service to see 
if it would be prepared to give an undertaking 
not to use anything said to the commission by a 
retracting witness in a prosecution for perjury. 
The commission has normally been prepared 
to interview the, now often much older, victims 
of child sex abuse without worrying about the 
question of perjury. The Court of Appeal is only 
likely to accept new evidence of a retraction if 
there is some supporting independent evidence, 
or at the least some very good reason to believe 
that it is true. It is important, therefore, that the 
retracting witness is carefully interviewed in or-
der to find, if it exists, the supporting evidence or 
reason to believe the new account. Sometimes it 
is clear that there is nothing to support the new 
account and no credible explanation for making 
the retraction or the timing of it. Child sex abuse 
victims who later retract are not very likely to be 
prosecuted for perjury and the commission has 
not been criticised for conducting this type of 
interview. 
Witnesses who wish to retract evidence given 
as an adult are a different matter in the sense that 
if there was evidence to show that an adult wit-
ness has deliberately given false evidence it is 
usually in the public interest to prosecute. The 
commission has not normally been prepared to 
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interview adult retractors without regard to the 
question of perjury. A section 19 police investi-
gation might seem the obvious way forward, but 
the retracting witness may be interviewed under 
caution and the legal advice is likely to lead to a 
‘no comment’ interview. 
There have been a handful of cases where the 
retracting witness has indicated a willingness to 
tell the truth so long as there is no risk of prose-
cution. On odd occasions the Crown Prosecution 
Service has, somewhat reluctantly, given an un-
dertaking not to use answers given to the com-
mission’s questions in any prosecution for per-
jury. This is not an immunity from prosecution, 
and, in theory at least, a retracting witness with 
such an undertaking could still be prosecuted for 
perjury if there was sufficient other evidence. 
The manner in which retracting witness inter-
views are conducted is decided on a case-by-case 
basis. There is an obvious conflict between the 
interests of the applicant and the interests of the 
witness who in retracting their trial evidence is 
admitting perjury. It would be difficult to resolve 
this conflict without seeming to encourage the 
retraction of evidence given on oath at trial. 
Competent and dedicated
The commission has been subjected to a good 
deal of criticism for most of its life. The first 
dozen or so referrals it made all led to the quash-
ing of convictions. I recall it being said that the 
commission was only referring ‘dead certs’ so 
that it looked good and was failing to apply 
the ‘real possibility’ test laid down by the Act. 
The fact that the record now shows that in more 
than 30 per cent of its referrals the appellant has 
been unsuccessful seems to have done nothing 
to satisfy those who suggest the commission is 
too cautious.
I have attended many decision-making com-
mittee meetings and I have never once felt that 
the commission as an organisation is setting the 
hurdle too high. I have never had the slightest 
reason to feel that a committee decision has been 
made other than on the commissioners’ view 
of the merits of the case. I have never seen the 
slightest reluctance to refer a case if the real pos-
sibility exists. No defendant in a contested case 
likes to be found guilty and no appellant likes 
to lose an appeal. It is perfectly understand-
able that applicants are unhappy with commis-
sion decisions not to refer their case. Since the 
vast majority of applicants do not get their case 
referred the commission is never going to be 
popular, but how does this translate to the com-
mission not being up to the job? I thought its job 
was to turn down cases that did not meet the 
statutory test.
The commission has a very competent and 
dedicated workforce, but I would not suggest 
that things are never missed. In a number of re-
ferrals the key point has not been raised at all by 
the applicant or his legal representative, but has 
been spotted by the commission itself. 
Applications to the commission have re-
mained at a fairly high level. Many of the cases 
have little or no merit. Cases are screened by 
commissioners and those who simply have no 
grounds that could be reviewed are rejected, 
but not without an opportunity for the applicant 
(and legal representative) to make further rep-
resentations. Screening commissioners must be 
careful though to ensure that there is no poten-
tial for the commission to find something capa-
ble of undermining the safety of the conviction 
in material to which only the commission can 
gain access. Again I do not suggest that things 
helpful to an applicant are never missed, but the 
commission as an organisation does its best to 
prevent this.
Some of the loudest critics of the commission 
are those involved in campaigns to support in-
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dividuals who claim to be innocent. It must be 
very frustrating for your efforts to be seemingly 
blocked by the commission, but the reality is 
that it is not blocking anything; the problem is 
the absence of anything that is going to get the 
conviction overturned. If an applicant, legal 
representative or campaign group feels that a 
commission decision is unreasonable then a ju-
dicial review is one option. Another is to publish 
the commission’s final statement of reasons for 
its decision not to refer the case to the Court of 
Appeal. This would expose the commission to 
a wave of bad publicity that it would richly de-
serve if it was, in fact, making unreasonable and 
irrational decisions not to refer. To the best of my 
knowledge no campaign group has ever pub-
lished a commission’s final decision not to refer 
and one is entitled to ask why. In any event, I do 
not believe it makes any sense to judge the com-
mission’s performance in general on the basis of 
its decision in any particular case.
The commission’s critics also cite a lower rate 
of referrals to the Court of Appeal as evidence 
that it is not the organisation it once was. It is 
true that referrals in recent years have been 
fewer, but surely this was only to be expected. 
In the 1980s and 1990s there were a number of 
high-profile cases of alleged miscarriage of jus-
tice. The concern about our system of justice led 
to the Runciman Commission and in turn to the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1995 setting up the com-
mission. The commission, when it started work 
in 1997, inherited 279 alleged miscarriage cases 
from the Home Office including many of the 
high-profile cases that were yet to be resolved. In 
the commission’s first year it received 1,103 new 
cases, many dating back to the 1980s, 1970s and 
some even earlier. This number of applications 
in a single year has never been exceeded.
Applying modern standards of fairness to old 
cases is likely to lead to some referrals and most 
of the commission’s more notable referrals relate 
to convictions in the last century. We are now 
more than a decade into the 21st century and 
things have changed for the better. The disclo-
sure regime set out by the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act 1996 has now been op-
erational for 14 years. While the regime has its 
critics the responsibilities for proper disclosure 
of relevant material are clearly defined. The Reg-
ulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 also 
introduced important changes that regulate all 
aspects of covert policing. It would be naïve to 
ignore the effect of 14 years of commission activ-
ity. It has exposed serious failings on occasions, 
which must have had some affect on the organi-
sations and individuals responsible. 
I am sure that I am not alone in thinking that 
our system of criminal justice is better regulated 
and fairer than it was in the past. I don’t think it 
is right to judge the commission’s performance 
by the number of referrals alone, especially since 
most of its best work ends with a non-referral. 
The commission can only deal with the applica-
tions it receives. If improvements in our system 
of justice have led to fewer miscarriages of jus-
tice and consequently fewer referrals then that 
is something we should rejoice rather than try 
to undermine the organisation that has played 
its part in bringing about those improvements.
So, is it time for a new approach? Well it 
depends on where you start from. I have left 
others to debate wider questions about the ap-
proach taken by the Court of Appeal or whether 
the ‘safety of the conviction’ is the right basis 
for determining appeals against conviction. If, 
though, the starting point is that a new approach 
is required because the commission is a failing 
organisation that is no longer up to doing its job, 
then my response is unequivocal – there is no 
evidence at all to support this assertion and a 
new approach is quite unnecessary. 
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Get me out of here
Louise Shorter was a journalist on Rough Justice  
and runs Inside Justice
I n the same week that the BBC announced it was to axe Rough Justice, three Court of Appeal judges quashed the murder 
conviction of a young man, whose wrongful 
conviction had been exposed by the 
programme. Barri White was in no doubt about 
the part Rough Justice had played in securing his 
freedom when he told reporters on his release: 
“Without Rough Justice I would not be here 
today.” Today he is a happily married man and 
a father. Unusually for miscarriage cases, the 
local police force re-opened their files and and 
recently charged a new man in relation to the 
murder. He will stand trial later this year. 
The BBC’s 2007 decision to quietly ditch its 
27-year-old household-name strand, genuine 
public sector broadcasting, was in part 
financial: factual output at the corporation was 
being slashed, a period The Guardian described 
as “swingeing budget cuts”. But chief executive 
Michael Jackson’s description of his Channel 4 
show Trial and Error as “a bit 1980s” revealed 
far more about the reasons media execs fell 
out of love with miscarriage of justice stories, 
in a climate of reality razzmatazz and celebrity 
schmoozing.
A little over one hundred years after England 
had its collective appetite whetted with the 
original whodunit, the Road Hill House 
murder case (recently documented in the 
hugely successful book and TV adaptation The 
Suspicions of Mr Whicher), the media latched 
onto a new twist on an old theme: miscarriages 
of justice. In 1860 the death of the middle-class 
child in a house locked from the inside caught 
the imagination of the public turning them 
into amateur detectives wanting to solve the 
horrific mystery of who had cut the throat of 
the toddler before forcing him headfirst into the 
cesspit below the outside privy. In 1961 murder 
once again grasped the imagination of a public 
hungry for details of an illicit couple, forced at 
gunpoint from a cornfield in Buckinghamshire 
to drive through the night. First Michael 
Gregsten was fatally shot, then his mistress 
Valerie Storie was raped and shot, though she 
survived. A BBC Panorama programme in 1966 
examined the case in detail and questioned 
whether James Hanratty, hanged four years 
earlier for the crimes, had been guilty at all. It is 
a question that endures 50 years on.
It was in the 1980s that miscarriage of justice 
cases became staple teatime fodder for the Great 
British public. Peter Hill, inspired by the work 
of Ludovic Kennedy and Tom Sargent at Justice, 
devised the BBC programme Rough Justice. In 
1992 he told The Guardian: “At that time there 
were equally important programmes being 
made by John Willis at Yorkshire Television 
and Ray Fitzwater at Granada. We were all 
investigating mistakes made before a case 
came to trial. That was the problem in the 
early eighties – the legacy of police misconduct 
from the seventies.” In 1985 World in Action, a 
strand seen worldwide, which in its heyday 
drew audiences of 23 million in Britain alone, 
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highlighted the case of the Birmingham Six, 
which of course ultimately ended in 1991 with 
those iconic shots of the six triumphant men, 
arms aloft, their names finally cleared.
Rough and ready
I joined the BBC production team at Rough 
Justice in 1998 at a time when the programme 
still had a dedicated team of half a dozen or so 
members at any one time, working on a range 
of cases. Usually two programmes were made 
every year, one less than in the heydays of the 
80s but similar in terms of the level of detailed 
investigative work done and comparable 
in results for the prisoners. When I joined, 
the team was made up of a couple of former 
barristers working as interns looking for a route 
away from the Bar teamed with journalists 
and researchers. It is hard to underestimate 
how difficult the job of raking over a murder 
case is once the conviction is in. The training 
opportunities programmes like Rough Justice 
and Trial and Error provided were hugely 
important in keeping the spectre of shoddy 
police work and dubious expert evidence 
under the public spotlight, and, of course, in 
helping innocent prisoners and their families 
desperate for help. In the ten years I worked 
on the programme I was constantly amazed 
by the level of support and assistance given by 
solicitors and barristers working pro bono for a 
cause, and an individual, they believed in.
From 2003 Rough Justice saw its operation 
scaled back, but it still continued to 
make critically acclaimed programmes 
about injustices. The nature of television 
commissioning meant that Rough Justice, with 
its brief to deliver one or two programmes 
every year, allowed in-house, immediate 
commissioning of programmes which were 
difficult, controversial and risky. 
In 2003 I made a programme that came out 
of the Rough Justice stable called Life after Life. It 
was about John Kamara, a man who’d spent 20 
years in prison for a crime he did not commit, 
whose case had first been highlighted by 
Channel 4’s Trial and Error. The programme 
showed the injustice done to wrongly convicted 
people who won their appeals and had their 
convictions quashed. These men were set free 
at the Court of Appeal without the safety net 
of parole, probation and a supported return to 
freedom in place for guilty people. John Kamara 
was released with the clothes he stood up in, 
two sacks of legal papers he’d carried with him 
throughout his time in jail, and a £46 travel 
warrant. He had no home, had lost contact 
with virtually all of his family, and, without a 
national insurance number, had no identity. 
It wasn’t long before he wished he was back 
inside. One reviewer said of the programme: “In 
50 minutes, BBC1 last night redeemed itself for 
almost all of its recent lapses with Life after Life – 
a compelling and important documentary in the 
very best traditions of campaigning television.” 
The programme would not have been made 
without Rough Justice. In 2006 a miscarriage of 
justice advisory service was launched at the 
Appeal Court to help people like John Kamara.
In 2004 a Rough Justice programme showed 
CCTV footage of a former soldier called 
Christopher Alder who died while lying 
handcuffed as police officers looked on, 
wondering whether he was faking it. After 
more than ten minutes on the station floor, he 
choked to death on his own blood and vomit. 
Following transmission of the programme, the 
then home secretary David Blunkett ordered the 
IPCC to conduct a full review, which resulted in 
a scathing report declaring four police officers 
guilty of the “most serious neglect of duty.” 
Rough Justice is still a rare beast of a programme 
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which the public remembers instantly despite it 
being off-air for five years. Today I run a not-
for-profit organisation called Inside Justice, 
which is funded through charitable donations 
to investigate alleged miscarriages of justice. 
Any mention of my training ground on Rough 
Justice to lawyers or experts, witnesses or 
police, results in immediate recognition of 
the series and universal respect, tinged with 
a healthy element of trepidation from some 
quarters. Television controllers keen on instant 
gratification for commissions within their 
tenure may have fallen out of love with the 
genre, but it’s not a view reflected by audiences. 
Life after Life had the highest audience figure for 
its timeslot for the entire year. Sean Hodgson’s 
release in 2009, after spending 27 years in 
prison for a murder he did not commit, received 
wall-to-wall media coverage and the man was 
so hounded by the press his location on release 
was kept secret. A Google search about the case 
gets more than half a million hits worldwide. 
The problem we all face in bringing these 
stories into the public arena is one of risk and 
investment compared to today’s standards of 
quick turnaround telly fixated with celebrity. 
Simon Ford who ran the Rough Justice unit 
says “the tragedy of losing Rough Justice is not 
just that television audiences are not being 
regularly informed of miscarriages. It is that a 
dedicated unit, tasked explicitly to do new 
journalism and fresh investigation has been 
disbanded. Newspapers will no longer afford 
dedicated investigative teams and it seems nei-
ther will public service broadcasters.”
Going public
Inside Justice was set up with charitable 
funding, primarily from the Esmee Fairbairn 
Foundation, to do the legwork required to 
come up with new evidence to get innocent 
prisoners out of jail, and their stories into 
the public domain. The case of former nurse 
Colin Norris, convicted of murdering elderly 
patients in his care with insulin injections, was 
investigated by Inside Justice. Once convinced 
of his innocence we took the case to the BBC 
and then, in collaboration with them made a 30 
minute TV documentary about his plight.  His 
application for a referral to the Court of Appeal 
is now being considered by the Criminal Cases 
Review Commission. 
We are not an alternative to a firm of 
solicitors, we work closely with existing legal 
representatives or can find a good solicitor 
if one is not already in place, but our expert 
advisory panel and extensive contacts can 
bring the opportunities for new forensic work 
to be done, which the prisoner could neither 
afford personally, nor qualify for legal aid to 
pursue. We re-examine case papers and trawl 
over unused material: vital work that won’t, 
in today’s climate, be covered by legal aid. We 
can knock on doors and track down witnesses, 
and shine that all-important spotlight on an 
increasingly ignored area of the criminal justice 
system. We try to work closely with Innocence 
projects and are forging links with universities 
and laboratories, hoping that our combined 
efforts will bring justice for individuals who 
have been forgotten and are lost in the system. 
It is important that these stories be heard to 
inspire future generations of lawyers, experts 
and investigative journalists to work in this 
difficult field, so they in turn can help future 
generations of innocent people, who will 
undoubtedly be wrongfully convicted. 
Miscarriages of justice weren’t invented in the 
1970s and ‘80s, television just discovered the 
notion then and started digging. They didn’t go 
away either at the turn of this century, and nor 
did the public’s interest. 
p41 to p42_SJ_Miscarriages of Justice.indd   42 3/6/2012   10:19:38 AM
remember the roots
43Wrongly accused?solicitorsjournal.com
Remember the roots
Dr Eamonn O’Neill is a lecturer in journalism at the University  
of Strathclyde and programme director of the MSc in  
investigative journalism
T he involvement of journalists carrying out investigations into alleged miscar-riage of justice cases and influencing 
the criminal justice system in the UK has a long 
provenance. 
Think of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, for exam-
ple, using his skills and public authority to in-
vestigate and publicise the George Eldaji case 
(which led to the creation of the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeal in 1907) and the Oscar Slater case in 
1908 after the German-Jew was convicted of the 
murder of 83-year-old Marion Gilchrist in Glas-
gow in May of that year and sentenced to death. 
A huge public outcry followed and a campaign 
organised by supporters was soon established, 
featuring lawyers, judges, policemen and Co-
nan Doyle. But it was to take another 20 years 
before the verdict was finally overturned (on 
the grounds of poor direction from the judge) 
and Slater was awarded £6,000 compensation. 
The publication of his little book The Case of 
Oscar Slater in 1912 harnessed his investigative 
skills and mastery of the short story to aston-
ishing affect.
Later in the 20th century, the public’s im-
agination was caught in similar fashion by the 
cases taken on by the likes of Ludovic Kenne-
dy. His list of investigations and campaigning 
reads like a grim roll-call of modern-age mis-
carriage of justice cases that shamed the British 
criminal justice system: Timothy Evans, Derek 
Bentley, Stephen Ward, the Guildford Four and 
the Birmingham Six. 
The University of Strathclyde is now home 
to the Patrick Meehan collection, an archive 
donated to us by Kennedy himself in 1986, and 
comprises several boxes of files, papers, cor-
respondence, books and campaigning mate-
rial relating to the notorious July 1969 robbery 
of a Mr and Mrs Archibald in their west-coast 
home, which later cost the latter her life (see 
www.strath.ac.uk/archives under Our Collec-
tions, Other Archival Collections). Patrick Mee-
han, a known robber, was later arrested but 
his co-accused, James Griffiths, was killed 
while resisting arrest. The archives reveal how 
Kennedy, then a well-known broadcaster and 
author, was approached by Meehan and his 
family, seeking his journalistic skills to rein-
vestigate the case. He wrote letters to the press, 
influential colleagues, placed articles in news-
papers and organised several, unsuccessful, 
appeals to the secretary of state for Scotland. 
Another suspect widely held to be culpable of 
the crime, was tried (albeit unsuccessfully) but 
it was the posthumous public release of a con-
fession by another accomplice, William ‘Tank’ 
McGuinness, to the crime which finally led to 
Meehan’s release. 
The archive includes Kennedy’s brilliant 
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book on the case A Presumption of Innocence pub-
lished after Meehan was released in 1973 and 
had received a controversial pardon (Meehan 
told me in 1994 shortly before his death: “How 
can I be pardoned for a crime I didn’t do?”). The 
implicit role of himself as a ‘custodian of con-
science’ was taken for granted by Kennedy and 
he clearly felt that he had to take the case on 
as a long-term project once he had convinced 
himself he was dealing with a wrongfully con-
victed man (see Custodians of Conscience: Inves-
tigative Journalism and Public Virtue, Ettema and 
Glasser, Columbia University Press, 1998). 
The tradition established by Conan Doyle, 
Kennedy, and later Robert Kee, Paul Foot, Chris 
Mullin and others, led directly to the BBC’s su-
perb Rough Justice series and later (involving 
some of the same team) Trial and Error at Chan-
nel 4. The successes racked up by them, and 
also the conspicuously brave campaign to free 
the Birmingham Six by Granada TV’s World in 
Action series, had a direct impact on the deci-
sion to form the Criminal Cases Review Com-
mission (CCRC) in 1997 (see, for example, Chris 
Mullin’s submission to the Royal Commission 
on Criminal Justice, established after the re-
lease of the Birmingham Six, at www.chrismul-
linexmp.com). 
Vital investigation
However, that long and hard-won tradition 
came grinding to a semi-voluntary halt when 
the CCRC was established since it was assumed 
the requirement for investigative journalists to 
be involved in cases had more or less ended. 
Alas, that was precisely when I found myself in 
the longest and most challenging investigative 
project of my career.
In the 11 years I investigated the Robert 
Brown case for Scottish TV, BBC and numer-
ous broadsheet newspapers, I dealt with both 
the old C3 department of the Home Office, and 
later the freshly-minted CCRC. The 19 year-old 
unemployed Scotsman had been imprisoned 
in 1977 for a violent murder of a 56 year-old 
single woman named Annie Walsh in Hulme, 
Manchester. In both my long dealings with C3 
and the CCRC I found that any actual ‘on-the-
ground’ investigative techniques were con-
spicuous only by their absence. In Brown’s case 
this was particularly unfortunate since break-
throughs were gained by me using precisely 
this approach (e.g. finding alibi witnesses; dis-
covering witnesses changing testimonies; loca-
tion fresh witnesses testifying to police brutal-
ity; obtaining independent forensic testimony 
from scientists at the University of Strathclyde; 
receiving official secret papers from Home Of-
fice sources supporting Brown’s claims of vio-
lence during interrogation; and, finally, strong 
evidence from senior police sources that the 
main detective leading the murder hunt was 
himself criminally corrupt at the time of the 
Brown case). 
Uncovering such compelling evidence in the 
“While the legal system 
finally did the right thing 
and overturned the 
wrongful conviction in 
November 2002, the CCRC 
would not have acted 
as it did without press 
pressure and it was left to 
me and other journalism 
colleagues to ask the 
awkward questions”
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tradition of earlier historical cases and then 
publishing it took the case out of the shadows 
and threw light on mucky goings on down the 
years. While the legal system finally did the 
right thing and overturned the wrongful con-
viction in November 2002, and freed Brown 
after almost 26 years behind bars, I remain 
convinced the CCRC would not have acted as 
it did without press pressure and it was left to 
me and other journalism colleagues to ask the 
awkward questions about why a secret Greater 
Manchester Police report (The topping report) 
identifying police corruption at the heart of the 
case as far back as 1979 was buried for more 
than 22 years and only surfaced at the 11th hour 
when the case was sent to the Appeal Court? 
I am still waiting on an answer and I am still 
banned from discussing the contents of the re-
port since it is still protected by a public interest 
immunity certificate.
Necessary criticism 
Some have criticised the recent wave of nega-
tive comment on the CCRC from academic, 
press and campaigning quarters. I understand 
this touchiness and resentment but I also reject 
it. The CCRC is a publicly-funded body, unique 
internationally, and therefore holds a special 
but still publicly-accountable position. No more 
than anyone should have stayed silent about 
the plodding nature of C3 back in the bad-old 
days, should anyone now feel it’s wrong to criti-
cally engage with the work its successors at the 
CCRC are doing. 
The key criticism I hear time and again, how-
ever, is that the ‘desktop review’ approach of 
the CCRC reflects an institutional unwilling-
ness to properly ‘investigate’ cases. I don’t be-
lieve that is true. What I do believe however, is 
that the CCRC’s lack of early-stage investiga-
tion into cases reflects staff inexperience (from 
top to bottom) in understanding how some 
door-knocking, witness-chasing and fieldwork 
can save time, money and effort and sometimes 
yield astonishing results. Now, a kneejerk solu-
tion to that would be to bring in some old cop-
pers – like MI5 employs so-called, ‘re-treads’ 
(retired employees hired on a ‘consultancy ba-
sis’) for its vetting process – and send them out 
to ask questions. But that would be a massive 
mistake, since experience shows that the last 
thing those involved in alleged wrongful con-
victions want to see is an old detective. 
Instead, the CCRC should look at its roots 
and understand how it would not exist had it 
not been for investigative journalists and their 
unique work. Moreover, it was the fruits of 
their techniques, practices and investigative 
models that led to the overturning of high-
profile cases that shook the foundations of the 
British legal system and forced the CCRC into 
becoming a reality. The cases involving input 
and leadership from investigative journalists 
stretch back over a century and have touched 
every jurisdiction with the UK. The CCRC has 
been in existence for less than a decade and a 
half and is very much a work in progress, but 
evidence indicates this body needs to radically 
change its approach to the former, in order to 
achieve more of the latter. 
“The key criticism I hear 
time and again, however, 
is that the ‘desktop review’ 
approach of the CCRC 
reflects an institutional 
unwillingness to properly 
‘investigate’ cases”
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Calling for  
renewed media interest 
Sam Poyser is a senior lecturer in applied criminology and policing 
I n 2003, campaigner Dennis Eady noted that “investigative journalism has for many years been virtually the only way 
that new evidence to overturn a conviction 
could be found. Despite the advent of the 
CCRC, this is… still the case to a large extent 
today.” I conducted empirical research that ex-
amined the role of the media in revealing and 
remedying miscarriages of justice. The results 
of interviews with more than 60 individuals in-
volved in miscarriage cases (including victims, 
lawyers, campaigners, experts, police officers, 
politicians and members of the media) support 
the assertion that, despite the existence of the 
CCRC, journalistic involvement in this area is 
still required, but has also declined over the 
past 20 years or so.
The importance of journalists in this area 
has been recognised from the top echelons of 
the judiciary: “Many miscarriages… have been 
identified… only through painstaking investi-
gations by journalists” (Lord Steyn in Walker 
and Wood, 1999); to miscarriages campaigners: 
“…every single righting of injustice has in-
volved journalists” (Morrell, 1999). The media 
have been investigating miscarriages in the 
UK for more than 100 years (see Lloyd, 2002). 
Their investigations and stories have caught 
public, government, and judicial attention, 
and contributed not just to the overturning of 
convictions (Marr, 2004) but ultimately to calls 
for reform of the justice system itself and the 
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establishment of bodies such as the Court of 
Appeal and CCRC (Sanders and Young, 2010). 
Some print journalists have undertaken one-
off investigations into cases single-handedly; 
whereas some television programmes such as 
Rough Justice have devoted teams to investigat-
ing a succession of individual cases, thereby 
developing some expertise in the area.
Such investigations have been possible due 
to the commitment of time and financial re-
sources, the journalist’s powers of persuasion 
and a ‘dog with a bone’ level of determination 
to see the job through (Jessel, 2004). With no 
special investigative powers, journalists have 
relied on solicitors’ goodwill and used good, 
old-fashioned detective skills, such as knock-
ing on doors, re-interviewing old, and finding 
new, witnesses and re-examining timings and 
‘place’ in a case, to reveal injustice. Such work 
is very difficult, financially and legally risky, 
emotionally draining and sometimes down-
right dangerous. Journalists investigating 
miscarriages have suffered abuse and threats, 
obstruction, denial, suppression from the au-
thorities and lack of support from superiors. 
Despite this, many have offered long-term per-
sonal commitment to cases, often continuing 
after a conviction has been quashed, in terms of 
fighting for compensation.
Aside from investigations into miscarriages, 
journalists have also provided victims with 
essential links to networks of contacts (such 
as lawyers) built up through their profession 
(Morrell, 1999). Through the “oxygen of public-
ity”, journalists have also brought a case to the 
attention of the public and those whose sup-
port has further strengthened it (Eady, 2003). 
Publicity, however, is dependant upon the 
newsworthiness of a victim’s case (Chibnall, 
1977). Victims of miscarriages associated with 
rape and child abuse are far less likely to be-
come ‘news’, as their stories are often consid-
ered ambiguous, or ‘untouchable’ by the media 
(Webster, 1999) and miscarriages arising from 
magistrates’ courts rarely interest them from a 
commercial perspective. Thus, generally only 
a narrow range of cases fit the media’s brief, 
with journalists ‘cherry picking’ prisoners with 
‘marketable’ stories (Jessel, 1994).
Despite the media’s importance to this area, 
this research confirms that over the last two 
decades their involvement has diminished, 
after peaking in the period 1989-93. The 
wrongful conviction of the Guildford Four 
was revealed in 1989. From then on, media 
investigations into, and revelations of, a 
succession of miscarriages greatly heightened 
their newsworthiness (Belloni and Hodgson, 
2000) and set in train a ‘snowball effect’. 
Now journalists were very keen to unearth 
miscarriages, their stories reaching front pages/
popular broadcasting slots (Rose, 1996) tied to 
a broader media narrative of ‘justice in crisis’ 
(Nobles and Schiff, 2001). 
Such heightened coverage of miscarriages 
is eventually said to have had a major impact 
“Intensified ownership 
and increased competition 
in newspapers resulted 
in diminished resources, 
and a move away 
from expensive, dry 
investigative stories, to 
the production of cheaper, 
lighter stories, presented 
in populist formats”
p46 to p50_SJ_Miscarriages of Justice.indd   47 3/6/2012   10:28:53 AM
calling for renewed media interest 
48 Wrongly accused? solicitorsjournal.com
upon public confidence in the justice system 
(Woffinden, 1990) – although whether public 
confidence did lessen at this time, or whether 
it was solely a media construct is hotly disput-
ed (Nobles and Schiff, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
very perception of a loss of public confidence, 
arguably acted as a major impetus for reform. 
The system had to be ‘seen to be doing’ some-
thing about miscarriages. This ‘something’ 
came in the shape of the Runcimann Commis-
sion (RCCJ), which reported in 1993 and recom-
mended the establishment of an independent 
body to investigate miscarriages. Many jour-
nalists had campaigned for this, arguing that 
the investigation of miscarriages should not 
be left to them: “An informal system based on 
the funds of commercial interests” (Hill, Young 
and Sargent, 1985). 
Diminished media involvement
The RCCJ signalled the end of the media ‘nar-
rative of crisis’ and the beginning of a gradual 
decline in the newsworthiness of miscarriages 
(Nobles and Schiff, 2000). In addition, the sub-
sequent establishment of the CCRC, some be-
lieve, caused journalists to deem their inves-
tigations superfluous (Naughton, 2009). The 
CCRC may have given media executives an 
excuse to abandon such difficult work (Jessel, 
2004); however, many other factors contributed 
to diminished media involvement in this area, 
including, from the 1990s onwards, changes 
within journalism and to the political climate 
within which journalists worked. 
Changes within journalism included in-
creased regulation and intervention into jour-
nalistic practice by lawyers and managers, 
meaning less journalistic freedom. The impact 
of new technologies, which gradually altered 
public reading and viewing habits, also led 
media executives to believe that people were 
gradually becoming less interested in lengthy, 
complex stories (Snoddy, 1996). Intensified 
ownership and increased competition in news-
papers resulted in diminished resources, and a 
move away from expensive, dry investigative 
stories, to the production of cheaper, lighter 
stories, presented in populist formats. 
In television, the Broadcasting Acts of 1990 
and 1996 increased competition and affected 
resource availability and programme priori-
ties. Broadcasters now prioritised low-budget, 
guaranteed ‘audience pullers’ over expensive 
investigative work which could not promise 
such high ratings. Some broadcasters also had 
their obligations to produce public purpose 
programmes relaxed (Curran and Seaton, 2003). 
This all meant a change in the priorities of 
people in charge of some TV companies, as 
highlighted by Carlton TV’s Paul Jackson: “If 
World in Action was to uncover three more seri-
ous miscarriages… delivering an audience of… 
five million, I would cut it. It isn’t part of the 
ITV system to get people out of prison” (Bar-
nett and Curry, 1994). Indeed, as one journal-
ist interviewed remarked to me: “Investigating 
miscarriages used to… have kudos attached to 
it… Now… the heady purposes of journalism… 
have diminished.” 
Another remarked that journalistic ‘duty’ 
had also changed to revealing a different type 
of miscarriage, through the ‘What scumbag 
have you let out of prison or not even sent to 
prison?’ story. Some journalists now began to 
devote investigative resources to securing evi-
dence against criminals ‘getting away with it’. 
This reflects the major change in political de-
bate on criminal justice, which began during 
the mid 1990s – one that moved from a focus 
on suspects’ rights towards victims’ needs be-
cause of a general perception of rising crime. 
By the late 1990s, wrongful convictions no 
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longer commanded mainstream political de-
bate, and this, together with the factors previ-
ously mentioned, resulted in most miscarriages 
programmes being axed and print journalists 
finding it increasingly difficult to convince 
editors that miscarriages were worthy of space 
(Jessel, 2004). Some ‘lone wolves’ continued 
to investigate miscarriages (Sekar, 1998; Hale, 
2002), as did Rough Justice (until its demise in 
2007) and today others, such as print journalist 
Duncan Campbell (with his revived ‘Justice on 
Trial’ unit at The Guardian), and TV journalists 
such as John Sweeney, remain fully engaged 
with the area. In addition, academic journalist 
Eaomann O’Neil has achieved some success by 
involving his media students in investigating 
miscarriages. However, journalistic involve-
ment in this area is much reduced. This is per-
haps a problem in the light of growing concerns 
regarding the performance of the CCRC.
Doomed from the start?
Since it began work in 1997, the CCRC has re-
ceived some praise for a more receptive and 
transparent attitude to cases than occurred 
with its predecessor C3 (Walker, 2002b). Com-
paring the CCRC’s work to that of investigative 
journalists in this area, it has produced a steady 
stream of referrals for less high-profile cases 
than most journalists would ever have both-
ered to investigate. However, more recently the 
body has been accused of not being fit for pur-
pose. Arguments centre around its 70 per cent 
success rate (Quirk, 2007), which consists, in 
large part, of ‘successes’ in varying sentences, 
substituting alternative convictions, and over-
turning minor convictions, cases which were 
not the spur for its creation (Woffinden, 2010). 
More recent criminal justice cut backs have also 
resulted in an increasingly under-resourced, 
under-staffed body, creating, some fear, a slow-
er, more superficial ‘paperwork approach’ to 
cases, rather than one that utilises its extensive 
investigative powers. 
The CCRC is also alleged to be increasingly 
inconsistent, cautious and overly deferential 
to the Court of Appeal in deciding not to refer 
some cases with merit (Naughton, 2009). How-
ever, criticism goes deeper than this, to argu-
ments that the CCRC has not undertaken the 
role that it was commonly believed it would un-
dertake, namely to investigate the convictions 
of those claiming to be innocent (Naughton, 
2009). The CCRC is bound by legal rules al-
lowing it to only consider new evidence/argu-
ment that casts doubt on the safety of convic-
tions and to only refer a case to appeal when 
it believes there is a real possibility that the 
conviction will be quashed (Walker, 2002). In-
deed, only around four per cent of applications 
result in a referral (CCRC, n.d). As the remain-
ing 96 per cent of applicants are surely not all 
dishonest, many innocents remain imprisoned. 
The CCRC (2002) agrees: “…where alternative 
explanations… are advanced… but [new] evi-
dential support… cannot be established… the 
miscarriage cannot be exposed”. 
It could be argued then that the CCRC, hav-
ing been introduced into the appeals process 
as a ‘middle-man’, who, from the start, had his 
hands tied by the system under which he op-
erated, was always doomed to be ineffective in 
resolving the problem of the wrongly convicted 
“More recent criminal 
justice cut backs have also 
resulted in an increasingly 
under-resourced,  
under-staffed body”
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innocent. This is arguably because, in creating 
the CCRC, the legal system found a ‘solution’ 
to the problem of miscarriages within the con-
fines of its own structures (structures that cre-
ated the problem initially) (Nobles and Schiff, 
2000). This is not the first time this has oc-
curred. Over the past 100 years or so, there has 
been a cycle of occasional crises of confidence 
in the justice system, allied to miscarriages, and 
led by the media, which have been addressed 
by the establishment of reforms that have, in 
turn, failed to ‘live up’ to expectations of them. 
This is because such reforms actually serve to 
enhance, rather than fundamentally change, 
the nature of the legal system (ibid). The CCRC, 
then, amounts to little more than a ‘bureau-
cratic tinkering’ of the system (Walker, 1999). 
Growing realisation of this has led to claims 
that the media are still very much needed in 
this area (Poyser, 2011). 
Different versions of truth
The CCRC itself welcomes help from those 
outside the system, arguing that cases most 
likely to succeed are those that arrive fully re-
searched and investigated with new evidence 
compellingly presented (Hill, 1999). This is 
something that investigative journalists have 
proved themselves very able to do. Interesting-
ly, in this respect, investigative journalists note 
that their version of ‘truth’ is different from 
that of the CCRC. As mentioned, legal restric-
tions mean that the CCRC is often unable to 
conduct the kind of investigations that can get 
to the truth of claims of innocence. However, 
the investigative journalist, free from such re-
strictions, uses common sense, not legal rules, 
to determine the truth. Indeed, arguably they 
have the best chance of determining the ‘truth’ 
as they can consider all available (and if neces-
sary, seek more) data (Hill, 1999). 
The current appellate system requires a 
major overhaul in order to provide a system 
that prioritises pursuit of truth, one that can 
receive compelling evidence of innocence even 
if available at trial. Until that time, journalism 
must continue to challenge the judicial system 
(Jessel, 2004), by demonstrating that ‘legal’ and 
‘common sense’ truth are different and through 
highlighting the growing number of cases, 
which, through lack of remedy, reveal the 
flaws in the system. Interestingly, the growing 
debate around the CCRC’s effectiveness 
may in itself spur renewed media interest in 
miscarriages as the issue provides an essential 
‘hook’ for journalists to hang their miscarriages 
stories upon. Ultimately this may set another 
‘miscarriages snowball’ rolling within the 
media, one that may eventually cause elites 
to feel that they must once again be seen to be 
doing something. This time, we must ensure 
that what they do actually makes a difference 
to wrongly convicted innocents. 
So, while we must all act as ‘watchdogs on 
the wrongly convicted’, the journalists inter-
viewed for my research argue that the media 
retain an inbuilt duty, or responsibility, to do 
so, because of the massive amount of power 
that they possess. It is more difficult today for 
journalists to ‘do’ miscarriages. However, in-
vestigations involving working collaboratively 
and creatively with Innocence projects and tell-
ing miscarriages stories via populist formats 
that emphasise the ‘whodunit’ element of their 
work (stories that continue to fascinate the pub-
lic) are just a few ideas for consideration. 
Certainly, bearing in mind the current 
problems with the CCRC, an absence of 
journalistic involvement in this area will mean 
that many more innocents will remain in 
prison, and the public will remain ignorant of 
the system’s failings.
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Poor defence 
Maslen Merchant is a legal executive at Hadgkiss Hughes and 
Beale Solicitors 
A s controversial and unexpected as it may be to read, in my experience a very high proportion of wrongful 
convictions are the fault of poor defence work 
by the trial lawyers.
The most famous of the many high-profile 
miscarriage cases of the last 20 years received 
such huge publicity because of the police 
corruption that was endemic within them. 
The discredited experts whose opinions and 
theories have been debunked and disproved 
have also hit the headlines for the very reason 
that these people were ‘experts’ – professionals 
employed to express an opinion based on a 
wealth of experience and knowledge in their 
field. These were people upon whom you 
should have been able to rely, without doubt or 
hesitation. The very idea that the opinion of a 
forensic scientist, pathologist or doctor may not 
actually be worth a damn is shocking. If you 
go to see your GP or consultant you expect to 
receive appropriate treatment; you expect the 
expert you see to actually have the appropriate 
degree of expertise.
However, it seems to be very difficult for the 
Court of Appeal and the CCRC to accept that 
some lawyers themselves who conduct trials 
are responsible for wrongful convictions; to 
put it simply, they are not up to the job. The 
criminal justice system assumes that criminal 
lawyers who practise are competent. It assumes 
that it does not matter who represents you, or 
what the charge is, whether it is speeding or 
murder the end result will be the same.
That assumption is wrong. As is the case 
with any other profession, there are good and 
bad lawyers. There are those, perhaps merciful-
ly few, who are downright incompetent. Some 
are well intentioned and hard working but lack 
experience. In my view, of increasing concern 
is the growing number of solicitors’ practices 
which, sometimes out of a perceived necessity 
to survive in the current financial climate, but 
often simply out of greed, believe that ‘big is 
best’ and that ‘economy of scale’ is the key to a 
successful practice. 
Profit first 
The financial pressures on solicitors’ practices 
nowadays are so great that turnover and profit 
rank far higher than actually doing a good job 
for the client and ethics come nowhere.
Legal aid fees in the Crown Court are, basi-
cally, calculated taking into account the seri-
ousness of the case, the page count of prosecu-
tion evidence and whether it is a guilty plea 
or how long the trial lasts. You get paid the 
same amount at the end of the case if you do 
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ten hours work or a hundred hours work. It fol-
lows, therefore, that the less work you do the 
higher your profit margin. The less work you 
do for your money the more cases you can do 
at any one time. There exists a positive finan-
cial disincentive to do the job properly, which 
is scandalous. It undermines the whole ethic of 
someone being rewarded for a job well done.   
Such is the desire to increase profit margins 
that some solicitors now do little more than 
read the prosecution evidence, have a cursory 
appointment with the client and nothing else. 
The concept of fighting your client’s corner and 
of the lawyer actually doing what is necessary 
to defend the client is anathema to many mod-
ern criminal lawyers.
So, how does this specifically lead to 
miscarriages of justice? Before the legal aid 
system changed a number of years ago and 
when you actually got paid (or at least could 
claim) for the work you did on an hourly basis 
I was shocked at the number of lawyers I came 
across who simply did not do the work that 
they should do to prepare a case properly. 
All lawyers seem capable of following the 
checklist type of approach to preparation. If its 
murder you instruct a pathologist; if its child 
rape you need a paediatrician; if its arson get a 
psychiatric report.
What concerns me is when lawyers have to 
actually think about a case; when something 
or someone out of the ordinary arises; when 
they actually have to earn their money and do 
what they are paid to do. Unfortunately it is 
very often the most vulnerable of defendants 
who suffer. It seems to be something of an in-
convenience to the modern criminal lawyer to 
get a medical report addressing mental health 
issues, for instance. The question of whether a 
defendant is fit to plead seems to be ignored by 
many unless it is screamingly obvious because 
of mental illness, by which time the client has 
very often already been diagnosed, sectioned 
under the Mental Health Act and is in hospital. 
About 18 months ago a man came to see me 
one afternoon with his friend. That morning he 
had pleaded guilty at a Crown Court to a seri-
ous sexual offence against a child. He told me 
that he was not guilty but had been bullied into 
pleading guilty by his solicitor and barrister. 
They told him if he was convicted after a trial 
he could get a life sentence. When he told them 
he didn’t understand, the barrister told him, 
“the same sentence you get for murder”. Petri-
fied at this, the man had succumbed to a plea 
bargain that had been offered on the morning 
of the trial. He instructed me that he was not 
guilty and that he wanted to change his plea 
and have a trial. 
It took about five minutes for me to have 
serious concerns that this man may have a 
learning disability. His difficulty with speech 
was a clue. The fact that his friend told me that 
he had an appropriate adult with him in the 
police interview was a strong indicator but the 
fact that it took him three attempts to sign his 
own name was the real clincher. 
When the judge read the reports from 
the psychologist and psychiatrist that we 
“The financial pressures 
on solicitors’ practices 
nowadays are so great 
that turnover and profit 
rank far higher than 
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for the client and ethics 
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instructed and learned that the man concerned 
had an IQ that placed him in the bottom 0.3 
per cent of the population, and that he was 
highly suggestible and suffered from a learning 
disability, he had no hesitation in vacating the 
guilty plea and allowing the client to have his 
trial. He was acquitted of the charge to which 
he had pleaded guilty.
What on earth were the former lawyers play-
ing at? How could you not see that this man was 
so vulnerable? What were they doing placing 
him under such pressure and why even men-
tion murder? Why had they not taken the extra 
care and time that was so obviously needed to 
help the client who was totally reliant upon 
them for advice? Was this incompetence? Was 
it lack of experience? I fear that the true answer 
is simply that obtaining medical reports on the 
defendant and putting in the extra work in the 
case, which was so obviously necessary, would 
prove to be such an inconvenience that it was 
simply not cost effective. This was an obvious 
business decision. What if that man had been 
sentenced and sent to prison? That would have 
been a gross miscarriage of justice.
Failing clients
Sadly, there are many examples. A senior duty 
solicitor (now a district judge) and barrister 
(now QC) defended a young man charged with 
murder on the basis that he was labouring un-
der diminished responsibility (an abnormality 
of mind which gave rise to a defence to murder 
serving to reduce the charge to one of man-
slaughter). They did not instruct a psychiatrist 
to assess his state of mind at the time of the of-
fence. The solicitor’s file showed absolutely no 
sign of the instruction of an appropriate mental 
health expert ever having been raised, let alone 
being given serious consideration. The psychia-
trist that I instructed was unequivocal in stat-
ing that the defendant was indeed labouring 
from diminished responsibility due to the hor-
rific physical abuse he had suffered as a child. 
The Crown’s expert agreed. 
I once spoke to a solicitor outside court be-
fore a hearing on a manslaughter case. I said 
that we were looking to get an order for dis-
closure of certain material we knew the Crown 
had but were not disclosing to us voluntar-
ily. She commented: “I don’t know why you’re 
bothering with the unused material, there’s 
never anything in it.” Really? Tell the Guildford 
Four that; tell Judith Ward, the Maguire Seven, 
the M25 Three and the Bridgewater Four. It was 
astonishing to hear.
Perhaps the worst example is that of a client 
of mine convicted of the armed robbery of a 
post office. He was serving 12 years. I went to 
see him after he was convicted and he earnestly 
told me that his solicitors had only seen him 
twice during the ten months he spent on 
remand before trial, and that although he had 
begged, pleaded and shouted for his solicitors 
to request unused material they had requested 
precisely nothing. I was sceptical; this was an 
armed robber, a serious offence. Surely he was 
exaggerating. The solicitors’ file confirmed 
that his instructions were entirely accurate. He 
had had two one-hour appointments with his 
“The concept of fighting 
your client’s corner and 
of the lawyer actually 
doing what is necessary 
to defend the client 
is anathema to many 
modern criminal lawyers”
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solicitors’ agent (a former police officer) and 
there were precisely no letters to the Crown 
Prosecution Service asking for any of the 
material that is generated during a major police 
investigation that so obviously might have 
assisted his defence case.
It took 12 months of letters to the local CPS 
branch, to their Chief Crown Prosecutor and 
ultimately the Director of Public Prosecutions 
before we even got a response to our requests. 
In the end the police handed over so much 
material that had not been disclosed before the 
trial that I had to make two trips to the police 
station to get it. It filled the car twice over.
The police were perfectly happy to hand the 
material over and confirmed that they would 
have disclosed it before the trial had they been 
asked to. One sergeant went to great pains to 
make sure that we had received every last item 
that I had requested. We sat down together 
and painstakingly ticked off one document 
after another; hundreds of pages of witness 
statements, descriptions of the offenders, crime 
reports and investigation logs. We checked 
that the many compact discs containing the 
recorded witness interviews were in order 
and made sure that the tapes containing the 
many CCTV angles of the robbery were all in a 
viewable format. 
The flaw in the trial process was defence 
incompetence; the failings were entirely those 
of the trial lawyers. None of this material had 
ever been requested by the trial lawyers.
Bleak future
Twenty years ago while waiting at court or 
at the local prison you would hear lawyers 
discussing the cases they were dealing with 
and the charges their clients faced. The interest 
was obviously in the job itself; how you could 
find that elusive legal argument to derail the 
whole prosecution or what unused material 
may be hidden in the back of a police filing 
cabinet. Nowadays, all one hears are lawyers 
discussing page counts and how to challenge 
the latest Legal Services Commission decision 
to reduce their fees.  
High-profile miscarriage cases attract 
publicity because of corrupt police or dishonest 
or incompetent experts; however, compare 
those relatively few cases to the number of 
cases that become miscarriages because of poor 
defence work. This is happening in every court 
every day to some degree. As cuts increase and 
the criminal legal aid budget is tightened it will 
only get worse. 
Conscientious, ethical, altruistic lawyers 
are now few and far between and the number 
of miscarriage cases rises proportionately. 
Today’s criminal lawyer is a businessman first 
and foremost; actually practising law seems 
to be sandwiched somewhere in between 
accountancy, practice management and 
marketing.
Access to justice for a defendant in criminal 
proceedings is entirely dependant on the trial 
process being fair. This extends not only to the 
judiciary and the prosecuting authorities but 
also the defence lawyers. 
There are far too many defence lawyers who 
fail in their duty to their clients at very basic 
levels and who, therefore, undermine the 
fairness of the proceedings as a whole.
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Righting wrongs
Alex Bailin QC practises from Matrix Chambers
To its credit, our criminal justice system now accepts its own fallibility. The establishment of a criminal Court of 
Appeal at the beginning of the 20th century and 
the creation of the CCRC towards the end of it 
both recognise this. Providing compensation 
for a miscarriage of justice is one important 
aspect of attempting to provide redress for a 
wrongful conviction. 
In 2006 the then home secretary, Charles 
Clarke, decided, without any prior consultation, 
to abolish the broad and flexible ex gratia scheme, 
under which the government compensates 
those who have suffered wrongful convictions. 
From 2006, compensation for miscarriages 
was payable only under section 133 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 – giving effect to the 
United Kingdom’s international obligations. 
Section 133 only permits compensation where 
a person has his conviction reversed on the 
ground that a new or newly discovered fact 
shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice. The scheme is 
concerned with failures in the criminal justice 
system and therefore contains certain filters 
that exclude many successful fresh evidence 
appeals. For example, the reversal must not 
occur at an in-time appeal, since that is the 
criminal justice system working correctly. And 
the non-disclosure of the new fact must not 
be attributable to the convicted person, since 
that would not be demonstrative of a failure 
in the system itself. But what constitutes a 
‘miscarriage of justice’? It is a phrase that has 
now entered everyday parlance and yet its 
meaning is elusive and it may mean different 
things to different people.
Most people would agree that a miscarriage 
of justice includes the conviction of an innocent 
person. But how is innocence to be established? 
Does the presumption of innocence mean that 
anyone whose conviction is quashed or who 
is acquitted at a retrial is innocent? And does 
the notion of a miscarriage of justice include a 
wider category of cases, such as those where 
the defendant should, would or might not have 
been convicted if the new evidence in question 
had been before the trial court? 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court recently 
had to grapple with these difficult questions in 
R (Andrew Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice 
[2011] UKSC 18. The case was joined with the 
Northern Irish appeals of Eamonn MacDermott 
and Raymond McCartney. Adams’ conviction 
had been quashed, after he had spent ten 
years in prison, following the discovery that 
information that would have greatly assisted 
his cross-examination of crucial witnesses had 
been overlooked by his defence team. 
By a majority of 5-4 the court held that 
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compensation for miscarriages of justice is not 
limited to those persons who can establish their 
innocence but also extends to those cases where 
a new or newly discovered fact “so undermines 
the evidence against the defendant that no 
conviction could possibly be based upon it”. 
At the heart of the problem that divided the 
court was the fact that, as Lady Hale explained: 
“Innocence as such is not a concept known to 
our criminal justice system. We distinguish 
between the guilty and the not guilty... A 
defendant does not have to prove his innocence 
at his trial and it seems wrong in principle that 
he should be required to prove his innocence 
now.” 
Ultimately, what persuaded the court not to 
confine compensation to the provably innocent 
was that to do so would have resulted in some 
people who are in fact innocent receiving no 
compensation. In cases in which there is no 
traceable DNA, for example, it may be very 
difficult for the defendant to establish factual 
innocence. But the majority of the court felt 
that it was preferable that a few people who 
are in fact guilty might receive compensation, 
rather than to exclude some of those who were 
innocent. The division in the court’s reasoning 
was sharp, with Lord Brown, in the minority, 
evincing a “palpable sense of outrage”.
The debate had been polarised somewhat 
by a previous decision with extreme facts. 
In R (Mullen) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 18, the House of Lords 
had decided that a “quarter master for an active 
IRA unit” was not entitled to compensation 
under section 133 or the ex gratia scheme even 
though the British authorities had procured his 
deportation to the UK by unlawful means, “in 
breach of public international law”. 
His prosecution was held to be “unlawful” 
and therefore he should not have been charged, 
let alone prosecuted. But the House of Lords 
considered that there was no defect in the 
trial process that warranted compensation. 
Although Mullen’s conviction was quashed 
as an abuse of process, he had not actively 
contested his guilt on appeal. 
Although Mullen’s case might be decided 
differently today, given that there was 
ostensibly a failure to make disclosure at trial 
of material relevant to an abuse of process 
argument, the Supreme Court was virtually 
unanimous in not wanting to extend section 
133 to include Mullen-type cases. 
It was Lord Steyn in Mullen who had sought to 
confine section 133 to innocence only, whereas 
Lord Bingham had gone wider and included 
those “whether guilty or not, should clearly 
not have been convicted”. Ever since Mullen, 
the courts have had to grapple with whether 
Lord Bingham or Lord Steyn was correct, and 
the Supreme Court has now steered a fresh, 
middle course.
Determining innocence
According to the Supreme Court, a miscarriage 
of justice includes but is not confined to those 
who are innocent. But who should determine 
innocence? The Supreme Court was divided 
on whether the Court of Appeal has the power 
to pronounce someone innocent – “a point of 
“According to the Supreme 
Court, a miscarriage of 
justice includes but is not 
confined to those who are 
innocent. But who should 
determine innocence?”
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great constitutional importance”. Lord Phillips, 
the president, thought it did not: relying on the 
Court of Appeal’s view in the Birmingham Six 
appeal that it was not “obliged nor entitled” 
to state that an appellant was innocent. Lord 
Judge, the Lord Chief Justice, disagreed. Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, the secretary of 
state must decide if an applicant for compensa-
tion is innocent – which is a somewhat strange 
state of affairs given that the CCRC was estab-
lished partly because the home secretary was 
manifestly ill-suited to that task.
The Supreme Court was also split on what 
constituted a “new or newly discovered fact”. 
Was there a reasonable explanation for the 
non-discovery of the fact? Did the defendant 
himself have to be ignorant of the new fact at 
the time of his trial, and did his lawyers also 
have to be unaware of it? Lord Phillips followed 
the generous interpretation used in Ireland 
where a qualifying fact is one “the significance 
of which was not appreciated by the convicted 
person or his advisers during the trial or appeal 
proceedings”.
The position regarding retrials is also 
interesting: a person acquitted at a retrial 
following an out-of-time appeal may qualify 
for compensation under section 133. But the 
category of eligible cases may be very slender: 
the defence case must be strong enough that 
“no conviction could possibly be based upon 
it” and yet if the Court of Appeal orders a 
retrial that ordinarily suggests that the case has 
only met the conventional “unsafe conviction” 
threshold. 
The Supreme Court envisaged a class of cases 
in which the Court of Appeal orders a retrial on 
the basis of new evidence whose significance 
only becomes clear at the retrial. How workable 
this is in practice is unclear.
The court was unanimous in rejecting all 
the arguments based on the presumption of 
innocence: it considered that there was not 
a sufficient link between the compensation 
proceedings and the reasons for the acquittal 
– reasoning, for example, that victims can sue 
acquitted defendants without violating the 
presumption. But whether that analogy is a 
complete answer remains to be seen: if, as is 
often to be the case, the secretary of state points 
to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in which it 
quashes a conviction but does not pronounce 
the appellant innocent as being dispositive of 
the question of compensation, then the link 
between the two sets of proceedings would 
seem to be very close indeed. There are pending 
cases before the European Court of Human 
Rights on the issue.
Refocusing the debate
The Supreme Court judgment is interesting on 
many levels. A test based solely on factual in-
nocence would have been very restrictive given 
that defendants are not required to prove their 
innocence at trial or on appeal. In none of the 
most notorious British miscarriage of justice 
cases (Birmingham Six, Cardiff Three, Judith 
Ward, Maguire Seven and Guilford Four) did 
the Court of Appeal declare the successful ap-
pellants innocent. 
By anxiously scrutinising what constitutes 
a ‘miscarriage of justice’, the Supreme 
Court’s judgment is a welcome reminder 
that our criminal justice system still makes 
serious errors that require rectification and 
compensation. That ought to help refocus 
the debate as to whether the CCRC is indeed 
continuing to fulfil its vital purpose in helping 
to right wrongful convictions.
Alex Bailin QC represented JUSTICE in the 
Adams appeal before the UK Supreme Court.
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The overriding consideration for the Criminal Cases Review Commission is the safety of a conviction. Put more 
strictly, and here lies the root of much contro-
versy, whether the Court of Appeal would find 
it unsafe. This severely curtails the approach 
that the commission takes. During the parlia-
mentary debates which established the CCRC, 
the requirement that the commission consider 
factual innocence was dropped. The work of the 
CCRC is seen through the telescope of whether 
the Court of Appeal will be prepared to receive 
it. In practice the issue of safety will hinge on 
fresh evidence or new legal argument. Many ref-
erences fail because they raise no new matters. 
There is a residual power invested within the 
commission to refer cases even in the absence of 
new evidence if it considers that there are excep-
tional circumstances, but this power is used only 
exceptionally. 
The problem with this narrow definition of 
the parameters of both the CCRC and the Court 
of Appeal is that they are concerned with safety, 
not instead whether the accused is guilty of any 
conviction. This is graphically demonstrated 
in the case of R v Stock (Anthony) [2008] EWCA 
Crim 1862 - the first and only case that the CCRC 
referred to the Court of Appeal on two separate 
occasions. The facts reveal a clear case of a mis-
carriage of justice that was not upheld by the 
Court of Appeal. The appellant was convicted 
of robbery in July 1970 and was sentenced to ten 
years’ imprisonment. 
Safety first
In dismissing the appeal, the court observed 
that its jurisdiction and duty was to consider the 
safety of the conviction and not whether the ac-
cused was guilty. The Criminal Appeal Act 1995, 
section 13(1), gave the commission power to 
make a reference if it considered that there was a 
real possibility that the court would not uphold 
a conviction in the event of a reference because 
of a new argument or evidence. Section 13(2) 
empowered it, in exceptional circumstances, to 
make such reference even where there was no 
new evidence or argument.
The Court of Appeal in Stock also referred to 
Thomas [2002] EWCA Crim 941, which made it 
clear that the power provided by section 13(2) of 
the 1995 Act permitting the commission to refer 
a case in exceptional circumstances (cases where 
there is ‘a lurking doubt’) would rarely result in 
a successful appeal. 
The judgment in Stock presented a clear rever-
sal from Pendleton [2001] UKHL 60 and represents 
a difficulty encountered by a number of CCRC 
cases where it may be difficult to find admissible 
evidence that affects the view of original verdict 
to the extent that it may be unsafe, and cases that 
are affected by the passage of time. Furthermore, 
Stock is not assisted by the general reluctance of 
the Court of Appeal as expressed in Thomas to 
consider exceptional circumstances.
Impact of expert evidence on juries
The development of authorities since Pendleton 
is instructive when considering the limits of the 
safety test. That case emphasised the role of the 
jury as ‘fact finder’. The majority opinion in the 
Court of Appeal was that in a case of difficulty 
they should “test their own provisional view by 
Constructive 
dialogue
John Cooper QC practises from 
25 Bedford Row
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asking whether the evidence, if given at the tri-
al, might reasonably have affected the decision 
of the trial jury to convict. If it might, the con-
viction must be thought to be unsafe”. In other 
words, the Court of Appeal is suggesting that it 
should stand back and consider what doubts the 
jury might have had. Pendleton was set back by 
Hakala [2002] EWCA Crim 730, which proposed 
a jury impact test. Here it was held that it was 
integral to the process, but, if fresh evidence is 
disputed, the court must decide whether and to 
what extent it should be accepted and, if it is to be 
accepted, to evaluate its importance . Particular 
concern around this case centred upon the Court 
of Appeal apparently seeking to usurp the jury’s 
function.
An analysis of referrals indicated that the 
commission is unduly deferential to the Court 
of Appeal in cases involving expert evidence. A 
number of commentators have suggested that 
the commission should become more proactive 
in seeking fresh evidence in cases of expertise. 
In the authority of Kai Whitewind [2005] EWCA 
Crim 1092, the court made it clear that the fact 
that the defence expert did not give his evi-
dence as well as it was hoped that he would, or 
that parts of his evidence were exposed as un-
tenable thereby undermining confidence in his 
evidence, does not begin to justify the calling 
of further evidence. Where expert evidence has 
been given and apparently rejected by the jury, 
it could only be in rare circumstances, the Court 
of Appeal opined, that the court would permit 
repatriation or near repatriation of the evidence 
by some other expert to provide the basis for a 
successful appeal. The court went on to observe 
that if it were otherwise the trial process would 
represent little more than ‘a dry run’ for experts.
Despite this guidance the Court of Appeal 
will, in exceptional circumstances, depart from 
its own structure for typically pragmatic rea-
sons.  It has been suggested that the CCRC takes 
a de novo role in examining expert evidence. The 
crux of the suggestion is that the commission 
departs from Pendleton and examines disputed 
expert evidence that was presented to the jury. 
This suggestion is in step with recent recommen-
dations by the Law Commission in relation to ex-
pert evidence. If the commission were to extend 
its role into examining fresh expert evidence in 
this manner it would depart from Pendleton and 
potentially be susceptible to an accusation that 
the role of the jury is being undermined.
More significant role
As a result of challenges facing the CCRC – not 
least poor funding that has caused difficulty at 
the commission ‘leaving staff frustrated... and 
dispirited’ – the role of organisations such as 
the Innocence projects has become increasingly 
significant over the last decade. At the end of 
2010 there were at least 100 murder convictions 
being analysed by justice groups throughout the 
country. Primary among these organisations are 
the Innocence projects which draw on US expe-
rience. Significantly, the US government allotted 
$1.3bn to facilitate post-conviction DNA testing 
under the Innocence Protection Act. 
Compare this to the UK, where legal aid is be-
ing squeezed to breaking point, and where it is 
rare for DNA to be successful in overturning a 
conviction. Take the case of Sean Hodgson, con-
victed in 1979 for the murder of a 22 year old. 
He had his conviction overturned in 2009 after 
27 years. Six months after his successful appeal, 
Hodgson was exonerated when DNA evidence 
testing on the exhumed body of a suspect re-
sulted in a complete match from the crime scene. 
Such was the disillusionment with the CCRC 
that his lawyers went straight to the police and 
prosecution who discovered that DNA on the 
deceased’s body was not Hodgson’s. 
p58 to p60_SJ_Miscarriages of Justice.indd   59 3/6/2012   10:31:35 AM
constructive dialogue
Wrongly accused?60 solicitorsjournal.com
Delving deeper
This is symptomatic of the driving force behind 
the Innocence projects to delve deeper than the 
CCRC is either inclined or able to do. The whole 
focus of Innocence projects is entirely different 
to that of the commission. Innocence projects 
primarily focus on ‘factual innocence’ compared 
to the commission, which will consider ‘wrong-
ful convictions’. For the Innocence projects, in-
nocence is defined in lay rather than legal terms. 
A person is innocent if they did not commit the 
crime compared to legal innocence or proce-
dural or legal errors that will establish wrongful 
conviction rather than innocence. 
The terms ‘factual innocence’ or ‘actual inno-
cence’ are used to describe those cases where the 
defendant was wrongfully convicted because no 
crime was in fact committed or that there was a 
crime but it was committed by someone else. 
In an article for the Oxford Journal of Le-
gal Studies 2009, Stephanie Roberts and Lynn 
Weathered observed that “it is necessary to out-
line the reasons why the CCRC was created, un-
derstand the differing emphasis in case reviews 
undertaken by the CCRC and by Innocence 
projects, and look at the wider role Innocence 
projects can play regarding law reform and legal 
education”. 
Despite the Innocence projects’ focus on ‘fac-
tual innocence’ they, of course, accept the need 
for appeals on the basis of wrongful convictions 
and irregularities. In reality ‘factual innocence’ 
is hard to prove and irregularities present a more 
tangible chance of achievement. Whatever the 
approach of Innocence projects, the Court of Ap-
peal remains steadfast in its pragmatic attitude, 
maintaining a restrictive approach.
There is presently a difference of opinion be-
tween Innocence projects. Dr Naughton argues 
that the CCRC has not fulfilled its remit. He 
argues it lacks focus on ‘factual innocence’ and 
makes the case for a specific body that is not 
bound to the Appeal Courts, is sufficiently re-
sourced and not dependent on government. 
These arguments are refuted by others who 
emphasise that the commission refers the ma-
jority of its cases on fresh evidence arguments 
rather than procedural or legal errors. 
There is no point having a body such as the 
commission referring cases without regard to 
the powers and procedure of the Court of Ap-
peal. Perhaps it is better to consider reforming 
the Court of Appeal to make it more receptive to 
factual innocence claims that would then have 
a knock-on effect for referral to the commission.
Any power of pardon would not rectify mis-
carriages of justice because it does not remove 
the conviction. This could result in the Court of 
Appeal rectifying procedural and legal error and 
a minister of justice dealing with cases of factual 
innocence. This will also remove these cases 
from the jurisprudence of the Court of Appeal 
and they would not be able to contribute to the 
development of the law, thereby depriving other 
appellants of the benefit of favourable changes in 
the law, and, in turn, those applying for a par-
don would not be able to use favourable appeal 
judgments to argue their case. Indeed, to suggest 
that the commission has no interest in factual in-
nocence may be doing a disservice to it. It is con-
cerned with unsafe convictions and it could be 
said nothing is more unsafe than someone who 
is factually innocent. The practicable problem for 
Innocence projects is that they are grossly under-
funded. There should be further constructive di-
alogue between stakeholders including the CPS, 
the commission, the Ministry of Justice, lawyers 
and campaign groups.
 
This article is based on the lecture John Cooper 
gave at the annual Ewan Davies law lecture at  
Cardiff University
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The dilemma of  
maintaining innocence 
Matt Evans is managing solicitor of the Prisoners’ Advice Service
I t is 20 years since the Birmingham six were released as innocent men, but the stark reality is that if their appeals had not been 
successful they would in all likelihood either 
have died in prison or still been incarcerated 
because of their absolute insistence of innocence 
and wrongful conviction. 
The Parole Board and Prison Service will say 
that there is no rule or policy that automatically 
prevents a lifer who denies guilt from progress-
ing through the lifer system, or from being re-
leased. This may be technically correct but it is 
a highly mendacious line of argument because 
clearly denial of guilt does affect the timing 
of release, and, despite the ongoing debate 
around prisoners maintaining innocence in the 
last few years, neither the Prison Service nor 
the Parole Board have made any real progress 
to resolve the issue. My understanding is that 
only two mandatory life prisoners have ever 
been released by the Parole Board on tariff (i.e 
their earliest date of release) while maintaining 
complete denial of the crimes for which they 
were convicted. Susan May, who has always 
maintained her innocence (and is still seeking 
to overturn her conviction) of the murder of her 
aunt was released in 2005, and most recently 
John Taft in April 2011. 
Indeterminate sentenced prisoners who 
maintain their innocence are especially af-
fected. It is they who have to jump through a 
series of hoops, relying on the Prison Service 
lottery to provide them with courses to ‘show a 
reduction in risk’ and so as to ultimately satisfy 
the Parole Board that they are ready for release. 
And it is they who continue to be confronted 
with the same problem: either admit guilt 
and comply with their sentence plans, or face 
the prospect of serving many years over their 
minimum tariffs and possibly never achieving 
parole. 
It is currently for the courts and the inde-
pendent Criminal Cases Review Commission 
to review alleged miscarriages of justice in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The ef-
fectiveness or otherwise of these institutions 
is referred to elsewhere in this publication, but 
prisoners whose appeals have failed for what-
ever reason, or whose cases are ongoing, are 
left to satisfy the key consideration to granting 
release on parole or life licence; namely is their 
current risk to the public manageable? And 
when looking at this the Prison Service and Pa-
role Board will always assume that the prisoner 
was rightly convicted. 
Risk assessment
Innocence-maintaining prisoners present 
many problems for the risk assessment process, 
problems that will only intensify with the 
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exponential growth in the number of IPP, 
high risk, determinate and recalled prisoners 
needing risk assessment, coupled with the acute 
shortage of appropriate offending behaviour 
programmes and prison psychologists working 
on an individual basis with such prisoners. 
The starting point, one would have thought, 
is that if someone is innocent they are not a 
risk to society. The credibility of such claims 
could be looked at, through, for example, the 
steps taken by a particular prisoner to clear 
their name, their behaviour in prison and their 
attempts to undertake work whether related 
to their index offence or not. However, neither 
the Prison Service nor Parole Board seems 
currently able, or indeed willing, to look at this 
as a part of their assessment processes.
On the specific issues of the validity of denial 
as a measure of risk, this is based purely on 
clinical wisdom rather than any scientifically 
founded measure of risk (Hood, R, Shute, S, 
Feilzer, M, and Wilcox, A (2002). Reconviction 
rates of serious sex offenders and assessments 
of their risk. Findings 164. London: Home Office). 
On a more general level, risk can be calculated 
only to a limited extent anyway. However, while 
the Parole Board is aware that a maintaining 
of innocence is not an automatic bar to release 
and that it is unlawful for the board to refuse 
to consider the question of release solely on the 
ground that the prisoner continues to deny guilt 
(R v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
ex p Oysten [2000] Independent 17 April, CA) 
increasing and unhelpful political pressures 
on the Prison Service and Parole Board has 
meant a risk averse culture permeates across 
these assessments (see the comments of Sir 
David Latham around the pressures brought to 
bear by John Reid and David Blunkett in www.
guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/Mar/31/parole-chief-
warns-overraction). 
Factors such as denial of guilt, attitudes to 
treatment and absence of risk reduction work 
are all therefore added into the mix of risk 
assessment despite their neither being reliable 
or valid. 
Another related issue is that both the Prison 
Service and Parole Board have formed a view 
that the assessment and minimisation of risk 
is premised through the successful completion 
of behaviour modification programmes, which 
require an acknowledgement of guilt and a 
preparedness to discuss self-critically the 
salient features of the offence. This presents an 
obvious problem to prisoners who continue to 
maintain their innocence, as they are unable to 
cooperate over something they have not done. 
Programmes such as the sex offender treatment 
programme (SOTP), controlling anger and 
learning to manage it (CALM) and the cognitive 
self-change programme (CSCP) depend on 
an offender admitting to and discussing their 
offences, either during the initial assessment 
stage, or during the programme itself, and so 
are not open to individuals who deny their 
offences. 
“Programmes such as 
controlling anger and 
learning to manage it, and 
the cognitive self-change 
programme, depend on 
an offender admitting 
to and discussing their 
offences and are not open 
to individuals who deny 
their offences”
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Managing ‘deniers’ in prison
In my experience it is a fallacy to suggest that 
it is common for prisoners to deny the offences 
for which they have been convicted. It is true 
that some do and this may be for all sorts of 
reasons. They may not be able to accept what 
they have done, may be trying to protect 
others, or may not want people close to them 
to know the truth, or in more complex cases 
believe themselves legally guilty but factually 
innocent (mercy killings or joint enterprise 
being obvious examples). Finally, of course, 
they may be entirely innocent. 
PSO 4700 sought to address the issues of 
‘deniers’ (as they are referred) by at least 
acknowledging that they form part of the 
prison population and their stance on guilt or 
innocence should be recorded. However, the 
real difficulty is that it fails to offer any sensible 
approach to those who might have a genuine 
case of miscarriage of justice. Such individuals 
are simply left in limbo. Even if they undertake 
courses, they are unable to give a full and frank 
account of their offence for the purposes of 
analysis for obvious reasons, given their claim 
that they did not commit it; simply looking at 
previous and often minor offences is not going 
to demonstrate a reduced risk in, for example, 
the case of murder. 
The incentive and earned privileges scheme 
(IEPS) highlights another difficulty. Since the 
introduction of the IEPS there have been a 
number of challenges brought by prisoners 
who, because they have maintained their 
innocence and therefore have not fully 
participated in their sentence planning, 
were denied access to the enhanced regime 
despite impeccable behaviour. However, these 
arguments – including the fact prisoners 
denying their offence are discriminated against 
in their access to the right to family life under 
article 8 of the ECHR, as prisoners on standard 
regime receive less or shorter visits than those 
on enhanced (R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex p Potter and others [2001] EWHC 
1041 (Admin)) – have consistently been rejected 
by the courts (R (Green) v Governor of HMP Risley 
and Secretary of Sate for the Home Department 
[2004] EWHC 596 (Admin)). 
An added complication is that PSI 33/2009, 
which came into force on 1 January 2010, has 
introduced pre-tariff sift reviews. The effect of 
this is that all lifer cases are now subject to a 
prison service assessment, as to their suitability 
for a Parole Board review two years before their 
tariff date expires. The test applied is whether 
there is a reasonable prospect or ‘is there a 
case for consideration’ for open conditions 
by the Parole Board? PSI 33/2009 impacts on 
all prisoners but its impact is most keenly felt 
by those maintaining innocence and who for 
that reason have not been able or willing to 
undertake offending behaviour programmes. 
It is also part of a move away from full 
judicialisation of the parole and release decision 
pertaining to lifers and those who maintain 
their innocence, along with things such as the 
removal (by the Parole Board (Amendments) 
Rules 2009) of the right to an oral hearing. Oral 
hearings are essential for those maintaining 
“The impact of PSI 
33/2009 is most keenly 
felt by those maintaining 
innocence and have not 
been able or willing to 
undertake offending 
behaviour programmes”
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their innocence. Given that their paper dossiers 
are unlikely to reflect favourably on them 
if they are not engaging with courses etc, 
prisoners maintaining innocence rely on oral 
hearings to put forward their case and their 
side of the story to the Parole Board. 
Explore and challengee
The Parole Board has been given only one 
power by parliament, which is to decide 
whether or not to release a prisoner. There 
is no mechanism to allow the board to look 
behind the court’s verdict and this is not going 
to change. Therefore, those advising innocent 
prisoners (and those whose decision making 
affects such prisoners) need to try to operate 
within this framework and look at how the 
crucial question of risk assessment in particular 
is dealt with.
There is a need for the risk assessment 
process to take greater account of all forms of 
innocence assertion. In particular, the nature 
and extent of, and reasons for, any assertion 
of a prisoner’s innocence should be explored 
and challenged in much greater detail than at 
present, using perhaps archived material that 
may not be readily available in prison files or 
the parole dossier.
The key issue affecting a lifer’s progress 
should not be weighted to, as it seems currently, 
what offending behaviour work has been 
undertaken, but whether or not the risk he or 
she poses to the public is acceptably low. This 
can be measured (as it used to be) through their 
interaction with prison and probation staff and 
importantly how they conduct themselves with 
other prisoners. 
Prison lawyers can also do their bit by 
obtaining (within the restrictions of current 
legal aid funding) expert reports to challenge 
often intransigent prison and probation risk 
analysis. 
The Prison Service itself also needs to accept 
that its general presumption that the convic-
tion was correct does not meet the case of the 
person who is genuinely innocent, but who has 
exhausted all avenues of appeal without suc-
cess. Suitable sexual and violent risk reduction 
work should be devised for those maintaining 
innocence. 
Furthermore, one-to-one motivational work 
should be more readily available for such pris-
oners, particularly when their stance is holding 
back their sentence progression. Reports and 
assessments, including the OASys form, should 
be adapted to allow for details to be provided 
about the maintenance of innocence and the 
reasons for that position. 
Finally, prison and probation report writers, 
when commenting on offending behaviour 
programme work, should distinguish 
between cases of non-cooperation or refusal to 
participate by the prisoner and cases where the 
prisoner is excluded from courses on account 
of their denial. 
“The nature and extent 
of, and reasons for, any 
assertion of a prisoner’s 
innocence would be 
explored and challenged 
in much greater detail 
than at present, using 
perhaps archived material 
that may not be readily 
available in prison files or 
on the parole dossier”
p61 to p64_SJ_Miscarriages of Justice.indd   64 3/6/2012   10:32:30 AM
uphill struggle
65Wrongly accused?
Uphill struggle
Laura Janes is a consultant  
solicitor at SCOMO
I n stark contrast to the now almost universal acceptance of the need to adopt a distinct and child-centred approach 
when dealing with children in a legal context, 
navigating the appellate system continues to be 
a very tricky, and grown up, process.
There are more children locked up in 
England and Wales than any other western 
European country.  Even though the child 
prison population has reduced significantly in 
recent years, the number of children sentenced 
to long sentences has steadily increased, 
largely due to the introduction of sentences 
for public protection. A representation order 
at first instance should cover the completion 
of an advice on appeal. But it is not unusual 
to find children serving life sentences without 
the benefit of a fully considered advice on 
appeal. The same is true of children sentenced 
to shorter, determinate sentences. This may 
include patently problematic cases such as 
pregnant girls breached for crimes committed 
earlier in their childhood.
The numbers of children serving sentences 
for public protection under the provisions 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 increased 
rapidly following their implementation in 
April 2005. Following the amendments made 
to these sentences by the Criminal Justice Act 
solicitorsjournal.com
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2008 in July 2008, there was an immediate 
decrease in the number of children serving 
public protection sentences. However, there 
has been a corresponding increase of the use of 
long-term determinate sentences in the same 
period. Since April 2008, there has been a 
continuous increase in the number of children 
in custody serving long-term sentences as a 
percentage of the total population. The number 
of children serving long-term sentences as of 
the end of March 2010 was 454 out of a total of 
2,145 children in detention. This represented 
almost one quarter of all children in prison. 
This represents an increase from February 2007, 
when just under a fifth of children (514 out of 
2,809 children) in detention were serving long 
sentences (the latest data from the Ministry of 
Justice shows a dip in the number of children 
serving long-term sentences but this is largely 
due to severe bed shortages in the youth estate 
resulting in the immediate or even premature 
transfer of long-term child detainees to the 
adult secure estate). A high proportion of 
all children in the secure estate are serving 
sentences for breaching orders or breach of 
licence.  
Least likely to have injustice remedied
The Legal Services Centre for Research and 
Youth Access (2007) found that, compared with 
other age groups, young people are more likely 
to suffer from clusters of severe problems but 
less likely to seek or obtain advice successfully. 
The study found that only 20 per cent of young 
respondents with welfare benefit problems, 
27 per cent with debt problems and 44 per 
cent with homelessness problems managed to 
obtain advice. This is true also in the criminal 
justice system, where a combination of poor 
advice and lack of understanding by young 
people appears to inhibit them from appealing. 
This means that young people are less likely 
to have injustice remedied. It is also the case 
that there are specific issues that may apply 
to young people that practitioners should 
be alive to and which may mean that young 
people are more likely to suffer from errors 
and injustice in the first place. This may stem 
from judges and representatives simply getting 
the law wrong because of the large number of 
technical differences that apply to children in 
the sentencing process, and sentences based 
on inadequate information resulting from 
difficulties that young people may face in 
explaining their case.
Grounds of appeal may be based on specific 
issues that apply to children and young people 
in light of the recognition that they change and 
develop in a shorter time than adults (see the 
decision in R v Lang [2005] EWCA Crim 2864). 
This may mean that a judge’s perception that a 
child will be unable to change in a fixed period 
of time may be incorrect because of the absence 
of adequate information. This is especially 
important if such a conclusion has led to the 
imposition of an indeterminate sentence. 
“A judge’s perception that 
a child will be unable to 
change in a fixed period 
of time may be incorrect 
due to the absence of 
adequate information. 
This is especially important 
if such a conclusion has 
led to the imposition of an 
indeterminate sentence”
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Frequently the sentencing court places 
insufficient weight on the welfare principle and 
the unique factors that apply when imposing 
custody on young people underlined by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council (2009). Often 
psychiatric reports have not been obtained 
where a young person suffers mental health 
problems or reports that have been obtained 
are incomplete. In relation to a proposed appeal 
all of these issues require careful consideration, 
investigation and appropriate decision making. 
Young people are often very anxious about 
appealing and it is usually necessary to visit 
them to explain the grounds and the process 
in person to both the young person and their 
carers.  
Primitive and unsophisticated approach 
While the Court of Appeal appears to be 
predisposed to hearing arguments concerning 
a young person’s capacity to change, there 
is a great deal of resistance to welfare-based 
arguments. The welfare principle set out 
in section 44(1) of the Children and Young 
Persons Act 1933 requires every court dealing 
with a child to have regard to his or her 
welfare.  However, arguments based on the 
welfare principle tend to be greeted with short 
shrift by the Court of Appeal.  It appears that 
the judiciary has historically taken a hard line 
approach to children.  
As the late Tom Bingham commented in 
his article on the use of the pardon (At the 
White House’s Whim): “The more primitive and 
unsophisticated a society’s criminal law and 
practice, the greater the need for an extrajudicial 
power to alleviate the injustices that will 
inevitably arise.” Drawing on examples from 
our own early history, Bingham cites examples 
quoted in the books of pardons granted to child 
killers (London Review of Books, 2009).
Capacity to change
In the case of R v S [2010] EWCA Crim 1462, 
the Court of Appeal quashed a discretionary 
life sentence imposed on a child aged 12 at the 
time of the offence, replacing it with a very long 
extended sentence. In reaching its conclusion, 
the court specifically rejected the proposition 
that life sentences imposed on children 
should be the subject of periodic review or 
that progress of a child will be sufficient to 
demonstrate that a sentence was wrongly 
imposed. The court was of the view that the 
judge had not considered the possibility of a 
long, fixed sentence and that this was in fact 
the appropriate sentence, presumably in light 
of the capacity of a child to change. The court 
noted: “We reach that conclusion particularly 
in view of the extreme youth of the child being 
sentenced and the need for all criminal courts 
to ensure that sentences upon children of that 
age are tailored not only to the need for public 
safety but also to the circumstances of the 
child.”
Baroness Hale has closely examined 
the development of the welfare principle 
“It is often necessary to 
do quite a lot of work 
to obtain the relevant 
document from the 
original solicitors and 
what actually happened 
at first instance because 
children are often  
unable to explain  
what’s happened”
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within judicial decision making in a series of 
impressive civil judgments culminating in the 
recent judgment in ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 
4. Agreeing with Baroness Hale, Lord Kerr 
observed that the best interests of a child “must 
rank higher than any other” consideration. 
In R v Secretary of State, Ex p Maria Smith 
[2005] UKHL 51, Baroness Hale explained 
that the welfare principle stems from the fact 
that an important aim of sentencing children 
is to “promote the process of maturation, the 
development of a sense of responsibility, and 
the growth of a healthy adult personality 
and identity”. This is reflected in the SGC 
guidelines, which state that “the intention [of 
sentencing] is to establish responsibility and, at 
the same time, to promote re-integration rather 
than to impose retribution”.
However, the Court of Appeal Criminal 
Division remains reluctant to adopt this 
approach.
Difficulties in representing children
It is often necessary to do quite a lot of work 
to obtain the relevant documents from the 
original solicitors and to investigate what 
actually happened at first instance.  This is 
because children are often unable to explain 
what has happened.  Many young people 
appear to have been wrongly advised that they 
should not appeal as they could get a longer 
sentence.  
Reporting restrictions
Many young people are especially anxious 
about their cases being reported and it is often 
necessary to make applications for reporting 
restrictions and take a statement explaining 
why this is necessary.  There is no statutory 
provision that explicitly confers a power on 
the Court of Appeal in relation to reporting 
restrictions, although it is likely that, where 
section 39 restrictions are in place, they continue 
and that there is an inherent jurisdiction for the 
court to grant similar restrictions.  Practitioners 
should always ask the listing office to ensure 
the case is listed with an initial only to preserve 
the position before determination by the court.
No special measures
While the Venables and Thompson directions 
have been incorporated into the Criminal 
Procedure Rules, they appear to only relate to 
matters in the Crown Court and below.  They 
do not explicitly apply to the Court of Appeal. 
It is therefore necessary to make special 
arrangements to ensure that children are not 
overly intimidated when they are produced for 
appeal hearings.  
Given the imposing nature of the Royal 
Courts of Justice, this can be a particular 
problem for young people who are keen to be 
present during their appeal hearings.
Ways forward 
Children undoubtedly suffer from lack of 
access to justice in this area of law.  Even when 
they are advised on appeal, lack of specialist 
knowledge combined with the rigidity of an 
essentially adult appellate system means that 
children may struggle to achieve justice.  
As a minimum, professional bodies should 
provide training on working with child 
appellants; the Court of Appeal should ensure 
that the practice direction concerning children 
is applied to itself and offer some coherent 
guidance on reporting restrictions for children 
at appellate level; and funding should be 
available as a matter of right for both solicitor 
and counsel representing children before the 
Court of Appeal.
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Evolution not revolution
Dr Angus Nurse is lecturer in criminology at  
Birmingham City University
C ritics of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) point to various factors in determining that the or-
ganisation has ‘failed’.  In November 2010, Bob 
Woffinden, writing in The Guardian, described 
it as little more than a fig leaf and with a dubi-
ous record of success; others argue that it does 
little to help the innocent who are wrongly con-
victed.  While it may be true that the CCRC has 
met with little success in quashing major con-
victions, its very existence (acknowledged by 
Woffinden and others to be unique) should be 
celebrated.  
Few jurisdictions have a body that routinely 
examines the cases of those who feel they have 
been wrongly convicted or unfairly sentenced 
and which provides free access to aggrieved 
citizens without the need to involve lawyers.   
But critics may legitimately consider whether 
the original role of the CCRC goes far enough. 
This essay sets out the case for development of 
the CCRC arguing that there is scope to extend 
its functions in line with other quasi-judicial 
bodies and models that exist elsewhere so that 
its role goes beyond its investigatory function 
to incorporate scrutiny of miscarriages of 
justice issues.     
First, the CCRC’s role is not to establish 
the innocence of those making applications 
to it. Instead its role is to investigate with a 
view to establishing the safety or otherwise 
of convictions in the cases brought before it. 
This is not to say that the commission is not 
concerned with innocence.  
Indeed, in December 2009, outgoing commis-
sioner David Jessel argued that “to consider the 
safety of a conviction provides a sterner test 
for the system and a more useful one for the 
innocent individual than any test for factual 
innocence alone ever could”. It also involves in-
dependent review of procedural and evidential 
faults that cause the innocent to be convicted, 
on a case-by-case basis. 
But the specifics of the CCRC’s jurisdiction 
under the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 means 
that in practical terms the CCRC is not seeking 
to establish innocence even though this may be 
a by-product of its actions.  The Criminal Ap-
peal Act requires that only cases with the ‘real 
possibility’ of the conviction being overturned 
should be referred to the Court of Appeal.  
The CCRC will naturally be selective in those 
cases that it refers to the Court of Appeal, but 
in this regard it is no different from any other 
investigative or quasi-judicial body, all of 
whom reach judgements on what cases they 
will and will not pursue and the criteria by 
which matters within their jurisdiction will 
be determined. The CPS does not prosecute 
all cases brought before it but instead makes 
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decisions based on guidance contained with 
the Code for Crown Prosecutors, nor do 
investigators for the Public Sector Ombudsmen 
investigate and decide all cases brought to their 
attention.  
One principle of quasi-judicial bodies like 
the CCRC is that they are generally granted 
discretion over how they exercise their 
judgment, and as long as they do so in a logical 
manner and provide reasons for their decisions 
there is no reason why they should not do so.  
Criticisms over the way the CCRC decides 
which cases to refer are thus criticisms of 
the decision itself not the actual function, 
and, while there will inevitably be those who 
disagree with specific decisions, it is the role of 
the CCRC, once entrusted with the discretion, 
to decide how to exercise it.
The courts have upheld this independence 
in a range of decisions concerning such quasi-
judicial bodies.  
Working within its role
In Re Fletcher’s Application [1970] 2 All ER 
527, the courts refused to grant an order 
requiring the parliamentary commissioner 
to investigate an allegation of neglect of duty 
against the official receiver.  The House of Lords 
concluded that the courts had no jurisdiction 
to order the commissioner to carry out 
an investigation.  
Quasi-judicial commissions and comm-
issioners must be free to exercise their 
functions as they see fit, and, in R v The Criminal 
Cases Review Commission, ex parte Pearson [1999] 
EWHC (Admin) 452, Lord Bingham made clear 
that the decision on whether or not to refer a 
case to the Court of Appeal “lay fairly and 
squarely within the area of judgment entrusted 
to the commission” and concluded that if the 
court were to assess the merits of the CCRC’s 
judgment “it would be exceeding its role”. In 
Morris v the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
[2011] EHHC 117, the High Court reiterated 
this view that as the CCRC “is vested with the 
power and duty to assess which cases cross the 
threshold for a reference to the Court of Appeal 
and which do not”. It is not for the courts to 
scrutinise cases where an individual, however 
aggrieved they may be, wishes to challenge the 
CCRC’s ‘evaluative’ judgments.
Critics also challenge the CCRC’s ‘official’ 
figure of 315 quashed convictions  arguing that 
it does not stand up to scrutiny as cases where 
sentences are varied or where alternative 
convictions are substituted are counted as 
quashed.  However, while the terminology may 
be misleading and such technical changes may 
make little difference to the convicted prisoner 
who remains incarcerated, it is important to 
bear in mind that such cases do constitute an 
effective review of a case.
The focus on the safety of the conviction is 
an integral part of the CCRC’s jurisdiction. It 
requires examination of cases specifically to 
consider whether there might have been error 
that new evidence could correct or which might 
provide grounds for a review.  It has never been 
the CCRC’s role to decide the innocence of an 
individual or to establish the case for reform of 
the criminal justice system.  
Innocence commissions are an entirely 
different thing, sometimes established to 
provide remedies for factually innocent victims 
of wrongful convictions (the error-correction 
model) or sometimes charged with providing 
advice about how to reform the criminal 
justice system to prevent future occurrences 
of wrongful conviction (the systematic reform 
model).  The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry 
Commission, for example, has as its remit 
determination of claims of factual innocence 
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from living persons, while the public inquiry 
commission model employed by Canadian 
provincial governments is generally appointed 
after a conviction has been quashed and 
conduct investigations into the causes of the 
wrongful convictions.  
But these Canadian commissions can also 
make specific recommendations for changes to 
the criminal justice system arising from their 
investigations.  For example, the Commission 
on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, an 
Ontario public inquiry into a wrongful murder 
conviction, made specific recommendations on 
the use of forensic science evidence, including: 
the requirement for forensic opinion to be acted 
upon only when in writing; the establishing of a 
written policy and guidelines on report writing 
for forensic reports; the creation of an advisory 
board and a full quality assurance unit; and 
the monitoring of courtroom evidence and the 
training of staff.  
Other Canadian wrongful conviction com-
missions have recommended: mandatory shar-
ing of investigation reports between all police 
forces assisting in major cases; recording of all 
young person’s statements in both audio and 
video formats; referring all complaints to police 
which call into question the safety of convic-
tions to the Director of Public Prosecutions; and 
guidance to trial judges on how juries should 
be directed to consider and weigh identification 
evidence.  Such recommendations seek to iden-
tify the causes of wrongful convictions and to 
aid in the development of practices to prevent 
their recurrence.  
Theoretically, at least, there is no reason why 
the CCRC cannot function as both an error-
correction and systematic reform commission 
– although this does require amendment to 
its jurisdiction. At present the CCRC rarely 
expresses views on legislative reform except 
in respect of legislation that directly affects its 
functions. However, there is scope to amend 
the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 to give the 
CCRC the power to make recommendations or 
provide guidance on the causes of miscarriages 
of justice. Other quasi-judicial bodies such 
as the Information Commissioner and the 
Commission for Local Administration in 
England (the Local Government Ombudsman) 
combine their investigative functions 
with a duty to promote good practice. The 
ombudsmen interpret their powers under 
the Local Government Act 1974 as providing 
a duty to provide guidance and disseminate 
information on what constitutes good (and bad) 
administration. By investigating individual 
complaints the ombudsmen may identify “more 
generalised weaknesses in practices, rules and 
attitudes” and from investigative findings 
identify a need for changes to administrative 
practices that will benefit other citizens. They 
disseminate this information in the form 
of guidance notes on good administrative 
practice and special reports on areas where 
common administrative mistakes occur. The 
Information Commissioner also publishes 
codes of practice and compliance and legal 
guidance.  While these bodies admittedly have 
“Theoretically at least 
there is no reason why the 
CCRC cannot function as 
both an error-correction 
and systematic reform 
commission - although this 
does require amendment 
to its jurisdiction”
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different jurisdictions to that of the CCRC the 
provisions of their respective legislation allows 
them to develop and publish guidance on areas 
of systematic fault identified through their 
casework, and guidance on the requirements 
of good practice based on the failures that they 
uncover through their investigative work and 
their developing body of case law arising from 
this work.  
The CCRC is uniquely placed to do the same 
for miscarriages of justice given its casework 
experience, and to play an advisory role in the 
development of the criminal justice system 
such that a repeat of miscarriages of justice can 
be addressed.  
Admittedly such a move would not be cheap; 
in 2010, Kent Roach, Prichard and Wilson Chair 
in Law and Public Policy at the University of 
Toronto indicated that Canadian inquiries 
typically have multimillion dollar budgets 
and these are temporary institutions with a 
mandate that is completed with the issue of 
their public report.  
But these resulting reports are among the 
most comprehensive analyses of wrongful 
convictions within western criminal justice 
systems and the CCRC, in contrast to the 
Canadian model which considers individual 
wrongful convictions, has access to an ongoing 
resource of miscarriages of justice evidence, 
providing for analysis of what goes wrong 
within our criminal justice system and the 
lessons that need to be learned to prevent a 
recurrence.    
There are signs that the government has 
accepted the need for systematic casework 
review as a tool to improve aspects of the 
criminal justice system.  In April 2011 the home 
secretary announced that, where someone has 
been killed by their current or former partner, 
a review will take place so that lessons can be 
learned to prevent future tragedies.  
The principle of domestic homicide reviews 
is to be applauded but action is also required 
to address other tragedies within the justice 
system. 
Time for action 
Miscarriages of justice ruin lives and under-
mine confidence in the criminal justice system 
and it is not enough that the state reviews only 
the safety of convictions no matter how well the 
CCRC does this (and despite its critics, let us ac-
knowledge its uniqueness in doing so). While 
the CCRC already does good work in provid-
ing for extra-judicial review of cases that have 
reached the end of the road, it has the poten-
tial to contribute further by not only resolving 
miscarriages of justice when they occur but 
also helping policy makers and professionals 
understand the causes of miscarriages and how 
to prevent them. 
For us to achieve this, the commission should 
be reformed so that rather than being a body 
within the justice system it becomes a body tru-
ly independent of it providing for extra-judicial 
scrutiny, the provision of evidence-based ad-
vice and guidance on how the criminal justice 
system can learn lessons from its ongoing fail-
ings to prevent miscarriages of justice.
“Miscarriages of justice 
ruin lives... it is not 
enough that the state 
reviews only the safety  
of convictions, no matter 
how well the CCRC  
does it”
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